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THE EVOLUTIONARY METHOD AS APPLIED TO MORALITY.

I. Its Scientific Necessity.

I PROPOSE in the following papers to deal with the problem of the application of historical method, the group of ideas centering in the term Evolution, to the problem of Morality. A direct study of the development of moral customs or moral theories is not intended. There are questions of method which (in the present state of discussion) seem to be inevitable antecedents to the ultimately more interesting and more important treatment of the actual and concrete moral facts. Difficult as it is to draw any line in the discussion of such a comprehensive matter as evolution, I shall endeavor to steer clear of purely metaphysical problems, however significant they may be in themselves, and confine myself to those aspects of evolutionary theory which have a direct bearing upon the problem of method.

While I shall be compelled to begin with certain very general features of the idea of evolution, I shall attempt to observe the limit just laid down: not carrying the analysis any further than is needful to get surety and clearness in dealing with the method of interpreting morality. The more general discussion is rendered indispensable because we are met at the outset with a *caveat.* We are warned off before we begin. We are told that the nature of moral facts and of evolution is such as to make it impossible to get help from this source.

The argument runs as follows: Facts of morality are of a spiritual nature. The phenomena of conscience are data of

value, not of history. To them applies the distinction of degree, higher and lower, not of time, earlier and later. What they are and mean in themselves, not their temporal setting, is the problem. To confound such distinctions is not only to get no help in understanding morality, but to go positively astray; it is to obscure that difference of value which is the unique factor in the case; and to explain away, not to explain, the essential reality. That an historical statement of any spiritual value is a *hysteron proteron;* that analysis of quality or intrinsic character, and tracing of genesis are distinct processes, have become fixed articles in the creed of the contemporary idealist. And no opportunity is lost to rehearse the creed. Many writers would have it that to discuss mind or morality in terms of the historical series, is to evidence such ignorance of rudimentary philosophical distinctions as to argue total unfitness for the task undertaken.

It is this wholesale denial of the possibility of using a given method with any fruitful and positive result, that makes it necessary to ask: What do we intend *in* science by inquiry into origins? and what do we secure *for* science by stating any matter in genetic terms? Is any purpose fulfilled by this mode of attack which is not within the competent jurisdiction of other methods? Possibly the method is abused in practice by its opponents because it is abused in theory by its upholders. The latter may think that through the use of the evolutionary method something is done which is not done, and which cannot be done; and fail to bring out the deep and large service that as matter of fact is rendered. Anyway, before we either abuse or recommend genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just what is it? Just what is to come of it and how?

An apparently circuitous mode of approach to these questions may be found most direct in the end. I see no way to get an adequate answer without taking up the nature of experimental method in science, and pointing out in what sense it also is a genetic method.

The essence of the experimental method I take to be control of the analysis or interpretation of any phenomenon by bringing to light the exact conditions, and the only conditions, which are

involved in its coming into being. Suppose the problem to be the nature of water. By 'nature' we mean no inner metaphysical essence; its 'nature' is found only by experiencing it. By nature, in science, we mean a knowledge for purposes of intellectual and practical control. Now, water simply as a given fact resists indefinitely and obstinately any direct mode of approach. No amount of scrutiny, no amount of observation of it as given, yields analytic comprehension. Observation but complicates the problem by revealing unsuspected qualities that require additional explanation.

What experimentation does is to let us see into water in the process of making. Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner or process by which anything comes into experienced existence.

Even those willing to admit this, would probably refuse to go further, and hold that the experimental method is in a true sense an historical or evolutionary method. A consideration of the reasons for refusing to take this step will throw light upon the problem. A strictly historical series is unique, not only in any one of its constituent members, but in the particular place it occupies in the series. Its own context is indispensable to its historic character. Now, in the physical world, with which the experimental sciences deal, sets or pairs of terms are not thus limited to any particular temporal part of the series. They occur and recur; and suffer no change of quality by reason of dislocation from a given context. Water is made over and over again, and, so to speak, at any date in the cosmic series. This deprives any account of it of genuinely historic quality.

Another consideration which gives us pause is that the main interest in physical science does not concern the individual case, but certain further and more general results which at once emerge and absorb attention. We have the common saying that the physical sciences are not interested in individual cases as such, but only in general laws. The particular case is taken simply as

a sample, or specimen, or instance. It has no worth in itself, but only as a sample. It is only a more or less imperfect illustration of the general relation which is the true object of regard.

An examination of these reasons will, however, lead us to the conclusion that while in the end we shall still have ground to consider the value of experiment as applied to the physical world to be genetic rather than strictly historical, yet this is due to an abstraction which we have introduced for our own purpose —that of more adequate control. The serial order, taken in itself or as reality, is strictly historical, and it is only by an intellectual abstraction (justified from the end it subserves), that we get pairs of facts which may show up at any point in the series; and thus get ground for attributing to them a generalized or non-historic meaning. Their existence, though not their working value, remains historic.

The problem of origins is, even in the case of the physical world, a strictly specific or individualized matter. We have no way of getting at the origin of water in general. Experiment has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of water, at a specific time and place, under specific circumstances: in a word, it must deal with just *this* water. The conditions which define its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and circumstantiality. We have a specific situation in which at a given point in time a particular fact does not present itself, and then another point at which it is found. The problem is just the discovery of the individual conditions which have made the difference at the two historical periods. It is these conditions which define to us the emerging or manifestation of the new fact, and which constitute its 'origin.' The question is a perfectly determinate, that is, individualized, one. What facts must be present in order that another fact may show itself? Any scientist can easily say to-day that by causation he means simply a relation of definite antecedence and consequence. Not every scientist, however, seems to have learned the full meaning of the proposition; viz., that the value of the conception is historical, a question of defining the conditions under which a given phenomenon develops.

Moreover, the particular water with which the experimenter actually deals never, as matter of fact, shows itself twice ; it never recurs. It has just as much exclusive uniqueness as is possessed by the career of Julius Cæsar or Abraham Lincoln. That particular portion of water could never have presented itself at any other portion of the world's history, any more than the life of one of the individuals named could have been lived in exactly the same way at any other epoch. To deny this is simply to fall into the error of the mediæval realist whom the average scientist is so fond of ridiculing. It is to admit the existence of some generic water which is no water in particular, and yet all waters in general.

Yet, you say, there is a difference. Certainly ; but it is a difference of interest, or purpose, not of existence, physical or metaphysical. Julius Cæsar served a purpose which no other individual, at any other time, could have served. There is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent. Not so with water. While each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence, yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well as any other. We can have substitution without loss. Water from the nearest faucet may slake thirst as well as that from the Pierian spring. And what is of more importance to our immediate problem, any one case serves just as well as any other to demonstrate that which is of scientific interest: the process by which water is made, and by which a great body of other and quite dissimilar substances are called into being. We do not care scientifically for the historical genesis of this portion of water: while we care greatly for the insight secured through the particular case into the process of making any and every portion of water. It is this knowledge of process of generation that constitutes the controlled interpretation which is the aim of science.

Hence our final scientific statement assumes the generalized form we are familiar with in physical science, instead of the individualized form we demand of historical science. Hence also the apparent disruption and dislocation from context in the stream of serial reality. The modern logician has correctly apprehended

the abstract character of this disjointed result when he says that all universal statements are hypothetical: announcing that when or if certain conditions are given, then certain consequences result, but not categorically asserting the actual existence of the fact as to either antecedent or consequent. When the logician recognizes the full significance of this statement, and of its counterpart that every categorical proposition is enunciated of an individual, he will be ready to admit that statements arrived at by experimental science are of an historical order. They take their rise in, and they find their application to, a world of unique and changing things: an evolutionary universe.

This abstract or hypothetical character should not disguise from us, however, the supreme value of the genetic statement arrived at by experimental science. It reveals to us a process which is operating continuously. Through knowledge of this process, we are enabled to get both intellectual and practical control of great bodies of fact which otherwise would be opaque and recalcitrant. Knowing the process, we can analyze, we can understand, the phenomena of water whenever and however they present themselves. The control, moreover, extends beyond just the water itself. Knowledge of process of genesis becomes an instrument of investigation into, and control over, impure waters; so that we can measure the amount and nature of deviation from the standard. It becomes an active factor, a useful tool in investigating fluids which are not water, and chemical compounds which are not even fluid. There is no putting a limit to the ramifications and applications of the theoretical and technological control afforded us by laying hold of an operative process. It applies not only to what the empirical logician is fond of calling 'common' elements and 'resembling' cases; but aids us equally in dealing with apparent divergences and discrepancies. Holding the process in its more generic features, we can follow it into its refinements and modifications. By the cumulative method, by bringing together our knowledge of varying processes and of the particular sequence or course of events in each, entire regions otherwise utterly unexplorable are interpreted, and made amenable.

Lest the reader begin to suspect that we have left the matter of the value of evolutionary ideas comprehending morality, let us turn abruptly to that field. I shall endeavor to point out that there is more than analogy, there is an exact identity, between what the experimental method does for our physical knowledge, and what the historical method in a narrower sense may do for the spiritual region: the region of conscious values. My aim is to show that the historical method reveals to us a process of becoming, and thereby brings under intellectual and practical control facts which utterly resist general speculation or mere introspective observation.

History, as viewed from the evolutionary standpoint, is not a mere collection of incidents or external changes, which something fixed (whether spiritual or physical) has passed through, but is a process that reveals to us the conditions under which moral practices and ideas have originated. This enables us to place, to relate them. In seeing where they came from, in what situations they arose, we see their significance. Moreover, by tracing the historical sequence we are enabled to substitute a view of the whole in its concrete reality for a sketchy view of isolated fragments. History is for the individual and for the unending procession of the universe, what experiment is to the detached field of physics. We cannot apply artificial isolation and artificial recombination to those facts with which ethical science is concerned. We cannot take a present case of parental care, or of a child's untruthfulness, and cut it into sections, or tear it into physical pieces, or subject it to chemical analysis. Only through history, through a consideration of how it came to be what it is, can we unravel it and trace the interweaving of its constituent parts. History offers to us the only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for the synthesis of the experiment.

The value of the earlier stages of any historic evolution is,

I repeat, like that of the artificial isolation of a physical fact from its usual context. The transformation of this logical advantage into a matter of superior excellence in the order of existence, is the root of the materialistic fallacy. It is this unjustfiable transference which calls out those protests referred to early in this paper; which have led the idealists to protest against the industry of explaining conscious facts in evolutionary terms. It is assumed that the earlier fact somehow sets the standard of reality and of worth for the entire series. In practice, though not in express formulation, it is assumed that the earlier stages, being 'causal,' somehow are an exhaustive and adequate index of reality, and that consequently all later terms can be understood only when reduced to equivalent terms. It is this supposed reduction of the later into the earlier, that the idealist rightly holds is not to explain but to explain away; not to analyze but to ignore and deny.

The procedure is the counterpart of the Greek and mediæval theories of the universe, in assigning differences of value to different parts of space. We have ceased regarding the celestial universe as of higher rank in the hierarchy of being than the terrestrial. Homogeneity of existence in space has become such an integral part of the working apparatus of the modern scientist that he can hardly put himself into the older attitude. Nevertheless, he is quite likely to fall into exactly the same sort of fallacy, when it comes to time instead of space. The earlier is regarded as somehow more 'real' than the later, or as furnishing the quality in terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated.

There is, indeed, a point of view from which the earlier in time is of greater value; but it is that of method, not of existence. That which is presented to us in the later terms of the series in too complicated and confused a form to be unravelled, shows itself in a relatively simple and transparent mode in the earlier members. Their relative fewness and superficiality makes it much easier to secure the mental isolation needful.

The fallacy of the standard character of the earlier is so intrenched and widespread that it can hardly be dismissed with

brief mention. The simple fact of the case is that the genetic method, whether used in experimental or historical science, does not 'derive' or 'deduce' a consequent from an antecedent, in the sense of resolving it, or dissolving it, into what has gone before. The later fact in its experienced *quality* is unique, irresolvable, and underived. Water is water with all its peculiar characteristics, *after* the presence of oxygen and hydrogen gas has been shown to be a necessary condition of its generation as much as before. A statement of the conditions under which a given thing shows itself in existence, does not detract one iota from the individual properties of that thing; it does not alter them. This is as true of water or any physical product as it is of the sense of obligation or of any spiritual product. It is not the quality, but the coming into existence with which science deals directly. What is 'derived' is just the appearance of the quality, its emerging into experience. The value of apprehending it in terms of its antecedent conditions is, as repeatedly stated, that of control: intellectual control—the ability to interpret both obviously allied facts and divergent facts, showing the same *modus* operating under different conditions; and practical control, ability to get or to avoid an experience of a given sort when we desire.

The fallacy assumes that the earlier datum has some sort of fixity and finality of its own. Even those who assert most positively that causation is a simple matter of antecedent and consequent, are still given to speaking as if the antecedent supplied the sole stamp of meaning and reality to the consequent. If, for example, the earlier stage shows only social instincts on the part of the animal, then, somehow or other, the later manifestations of human conscience are only animal instincts disguised and overlaid. To attribute any additional meaning to them, is an illusion to be banished by a proper scientific view. Now, the earlier fact is no more a finished thing, or completely given reality, than is the later. Indeed, the entire significance of the experimental method is that attention centers upon either antecedent or consequent simply because of interest in a process. The antecedent is of worth because it defines one term of the process of becoming; the consequent because it defines the other term. Both are

strictly subordinated to the process to which they give terms, limits.

The analogy with the terms of an algebraic series is more than a metaphor. The earlier terms do not develop the later ones. The earlier term is just as incomprehensible in itself as is the later one. Taken together, they constitute elements in a problem which is solved by discovering a continuous process or course which, individualized by the limiting terms, shows itself first in one form and then in the other. The interest in the generation of water does not terminate with the discovery of H_2 and O. We have also gained significant facts with reference to the H_2 and the O in knowing that when they come together they give water. To know that about them is to know *them* through and in a process, exactly as analyzing water into them explains water in genetic terms. Excepting as H and O are known in this 'effect' (and, of course, in other similar ones), they are absolutely unknown—they are an algebraic *X* and *Y*.

The reason this matter is not clear to the popular consciousness, as well as to the expert writer, is because an older, purely metaphysical conception of causation survives, according to which the cause is somehow superior in rank and excellence to the effect. The effects are regarded as somehow all inside the womb of cause, only awaiting their proper time to be delivered. They are considered as derived and secondary, not simply in the order of time, but in the order of existence. Materialism arises just out of this fetichlike worship of the antecedent. Writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world, if we only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it, we could deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the world, life, and society. It is pretty clear, however, that in order to have this adequate knowledge of primitive phenomena as 'cause,' we should have to know everything that has come after as 'effect.' We do not know what it is as 'cause' (that is we do not know it at all), excepting as we know it through its 'effects.' The entire novel of a penny-a-liner may possibly be deduced from its first chapter,

but hardly that of an artist. Our adequate knowledge of the earlier constitution of the stellar universe depends upon the degree in which we are familiar with what as a matter of fact has come since. So the comprehensive world-formula about the operation of certain forces depends absolutely upon the empirical knowledge that as matter of fact certain results take place when certain conditions are present. The formula is a mere summary or shorthand record of the entire historical series—so much for its magic power in deduction and derivation. The mode of reasoning is tautological. Since we know the nature of the antecedent only through the specific consequence, adequate knowledge of primitive conditions can mean nothing else but a complete knowledge of the whole thing from beginning to end. It is surprising how *a priori* the average empiricist becomes the moment he takes himself to the adoration of causes. He surrenders his belief in a reality apprehended through experience, in behalf of a notion of the superior metaphysical excellence of what he mentally constructs as a bygone existence. He regards the later terms of experience not as real in their experienced character, but as something to be deduced or derived from a reality adequately given in what he is pleased to denominate cause.

So much time has been spent upon the fallacy involved in supposing that the early forms of an historical series are superior to the later, that before passing on I must recur to the proposition on its positive side. It still remains true that the statement of any event or historical series, in terms of its earlier members, has an advantage for science: its logical superiority consists in presenting the matter in so simplified a form that we can detach and grasp separately elements which are wholly lost in the confused complexity of the mature phases. We can single out a particular fact from its company of associates, and give it more exact and more exclusive attention. This is what is meant by saying that history does for moral matters, for matters of conscious value, what experimentation does for physical things: it gives control by furnishing relative isolation.

This also establishes the significance of the later members of the series. Starting with the earlier ones as our clue, we can

trace each successive degree of complication as it introduces itself. Having found conditions operating historically by themselves, we can see what happens when these conditions come together. We can refer the more complicated fact to the combination of conditions. Here we have the counterpart of the synthetic recombination, or cumulative method of experiment. We put together the separate threads coming from different sources, and see how they are woven into a pattern so extensive and minute as to defy the analysis of direct inspection.

We should be prepared, from our foregoing discussion, to see how this superiority and logical value is also given ontological significance. Just as the materialist isolates and deifies the earlier term as an exponent of reality, so the idealist deals with the later term. To him it is the reality of which the first form is simply the appearance. He contrasts the various members of the series as possessing different degrees of reality, the more primitive being nearest zero. To him the reality is somehow 'latent' or 'potential' in the earlier forms, and, gradually working from within, transforms them until it finds for itself a fairly adequate expression. It is an axiom with him that what is evolved in the latest form is involved in the earliest. The later reality is, therefore, to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the first forms are, if not illusions, at least poor excuses for being. We are all familiar with these applications of the Aristotelian metaphysics to the evolutionary process. We are not concerned here with the metaphysical problems involved, though they are serious enough: as the notion that the real somehow chooses an imperfect mode or vehicle of expression for itself, and only after a long series of more or less abortive attempts succeeds in showing itself as the reality. It is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a particular case of the general fallacy just discussed—the emphasis of a particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in reference to all terms.

Both the earlier and the later are simply limits which define the process in question. They are the framework which gives it outline; they are the terms which characterize the problem to be

attacked. The introduction of more detailed intermediate terms, together with a statement of their exact temporal and quantitative relations to each other, fill out the outline. They give us finally a complete whole, constituted by members standing in orderly and consecutive relations to each other.

Just as experiment transforms a brute physical fact into a relatively luminous series of changes, so evolutionary method applied to a moral fact does not leave us either with a mere animal instinct on one side, or with the spiritual categoric imperative on the other. It reveals to us a single continuing process in which both animal instinct and the sense of duty have their place. It puts us in possession of a concrete whole.

The analogy with modern biological interests is significant. There was a time when units of fixed structure seemed alone to have importance. They, by simple physical juxtaposition and combination, were supposed to account for all more complex forms and functions. For logical purposes it makes no difference whether these units are 'cells' with relation to the organism as a whole, or brain 'centers' with reference to certain neural functions. Some peculiar property was supposed to be resident in these units, which somehow controlled or explained other activities and structures. Now, morphology is ceasing to lord it over physiology; and physiology is ceasing to be a mere matter of certain functions. It is a chemico-physical process operating wherever we have organized structure and the performance of function that is the subject of scientific attention. The problem is to discover and analyze this process, and then trace its different modes of operation as it presents itself under a variety of conditions; these conditions being stated definitely through experimental control. Just as the biologist is surrendering the attempt to locate his reality in one spot rather than another, in the cell as such, or the brain center as such, so the moralist must cease trying to find the key to his problem in the animal instinct as such; and as the biologist has ceased taking a function as ultimate and self-explanatory, so the moralist must cease discussing the refined moral consciousness of civilization as final. He must turn to the moralizing process which operates con-

tinuously, and endeavor to account for its different manifestations under differentials of condition historically presented.

This whole matter may indeed be summed up in terms of the conception of causation. If we assume the meaning of this notion to be a relation of antecedent and consequent, we cannot play fast and loose with it. The cause is not merely an antecedent; it is *what* it is *as* antecedent, and cannot be regarded as real when severed from that which succeeds it. The same holds of the consequent—it is what it is only as a term in the series. But we do more than place the antecedent and consequent. We get the continuous reality. And then the entire series, the defined and historic event, is itself employed to interpret and construct a larger realm of experience. Through the series we better apprehend the universe. It is that which is characterized by and through such a history. The historic consequence is a predicate of a new subject.

We get a more thorough and adequate experience of the antecedents, H and O, and of the consequent, water, in finding out how water is generated. But we do not stop at this point. The entire sequence to which both antecedence and consequence belong, becomes an important factor in realizing the nature of the world in which such an event takes place. Our drama becomes in turn a significant episode in a larger drama. So in moral matters we comprehend both the animal instinct and the human categorical imperative when we place them as limiting terms of a single continuous history. But over and above this, we understand better the universe, knowing that it is of a kind to be marked by such a history. It is in the light of such a more ultimate judgment, made possible by the evolutionary method, that we see how limited is the view that tells us that history can only speak of certain external things that have happened to morality; can trace its outward fortunes, but reveal nothing of its nature. It shows us morality in the position which it occupies in the universe; in the situations that demand it.

Having found in the apprehension of process, the reality which eludes us when we look for it either in earlier or later terms, we have to be careful to avoid a further error, viz: *the confusion of*

continuity of process with identity of content. The following quotation illustrates the error to which I refer: "We may raise the single inductive inquiry, What acts have men everywhere and at all times considered right or wrong respectively, and what acts have some considered right or indifferent and others wrong? Tables of agreement and difference can be drawn up to show what mankind at least has regarded as the essential content of the moral law. . . . For the rich harvest which this treatment of the moral field is sure to yield, we shall have to wait until the spirit of science has exorcised the spirit of speculation from our contending schools of ethics" (Schurman, *The Ethical Import of Darwinism*, pp. 205, 206). "The science of historical ethics is still too young to have established what moral principles are ultimate and fundamental—that is, what principles man everywhere and at all times has considered binding" (*Ibid.*, p. 255).

The implication of the quotations is that the scientific method is concerned with the abstraction of a certain common and unchanging content—that it is on the lookout for some duty or duties that have been regarded at all times and in all places as equally binding. I seize upon this conception because it is sufficiently near the proposition just presented to make it worth while to indicate the difference between them. I have insisted that the scientific method is concerned with the discovery of a common and continuous process, and that this can be determined only historically. The notion now propounded is that science is concerned with a common content or structure of beliefs, and this can be apprehended historically. I do not find, however, that it is identity of content which is important, either theoretically or practically. On the contrary, the method of comparison and abstraction which leaves us with simply a fixed common element apart from all diversity and variety, gives a mere *caput mortuum*, rigidly static, arbitrary, a residuum without explanation. Practically, it gives us no leverage for what is the most important thing—control.

Doubtless it is true that other historical sciences have passed through a 'comparative' period in which the discovery of a common element of structure was taken to be the object of search;

but the other sciences have left that point of view far behind. The comparative anatomist knows very well that external similarity is no guarantee of identity of function, or of homologous organs; and that like functions may be exercised through modes of structure which externally are characterized by the most profound and extensive differences. The same is true of the comparative philologist. It is only in the region of consciousness, in discussing myths, rites, institutions, and moral practices, that the idea persists that the important thing is to hit upon some structure which is everywhere alike. The advance which has taken place in the biological and quasi-biological sciences is sure to take place in the social sciences as well. What the biologist instinctively searches for (given as data a variety of different forms or species, with the problem of tracing their relationship) is first a common ancestor. This furnishes a point of departure and supplies one limiting term of the series under consideration. The present differentiated forms furnish the other limiting term. The problem is to discover the single process which, operating under definitely different conditions, has manifested itself in these specifically different outward forms. Knowledge of differences is just as important as that of the generic identity of the process. The function of locomotion is a mere abstraction, excepting as we can trace and define its performance through environmental conditions that give rise equally to the legless snake, the fins of the fish, the wings of the bird, and the legs of the quadruped. It is only through insight into diversification that the hold upon the process becomes vital and concrete. Similarly in morals. Supposing (which does not seem to be the case) that an identical belief regarding the duty of parental care, or of conjugal fidelity, could be discovered in human societies at all times and places. This would throw no light whatsoever upon the scientific significance of that phenomenon. On the other hand, an adequate knowledge of historical facts might throw great light upon the ethics of family relations, exhibited in complete neglect of children as well as in self-sacrificing devotion to their welfare, and in all stages of regard and disregard of personal faithfulness as between husband and wife.

The very differences of belief become significant when they can be referred to varying conditions which have brought them about.

Just one word on the practical side. The common and rigidly fixed content gives no help regarding the future. It gives no indication of the method of progress in any desired direction. There is no way of turning it over into a mode of control of future experience, either in corporate action or individual education. It is just a bare isolated final fact. If any use at all could be made of it, the tendency would be to lower the working standard of moral action in all more advanced societies. By hypothesis, it furnishes only the duty which is common to the lowest with the highest. The essence of moral struggle and of moral progress lies, however, precisely in that region where sections of society, or groups of individuals, are becoming conscious of the necessity of ideals of a higher and more generalized order than those recognized in the past. To fix upon that which has been believed everywhere, and at all times "as the essential content of the moral law," would give practical morality a tremendous set-back.

The previous discussion may be summarized as follows: The object of science is primarily to give intellectual control—that is, ability to interpret phenomena—and secondarily, practical control—that is, ability to secure desirable and avoid undesirable future experiences. Second, experiment accomplishes this in physical sciences. It takes an unanalyzed total fact which in its totality must simply be accepted at its face value, and shows the exact and exclusive conditions of its origin. By this means it takes it out of its opaque isolation and gives it meaning by presenting it as a distinct and yet related part of a larger historic continuum. Third, the discovery of the process becomes at once an instrument for the interpretation of other facts which are explainable by reference to the process operating under somewhat different conditions. Fourth, the significance of conscious or spiritual values cannot be made out by direct inspection, nor yet by direct physical dissection and recomposition. They are, therefore, outside the scope of science except so far as amenable to historic method. Fifth, history gives us these facts in process of becoming or

generation; the earlier terms of the series provide us with a simplification which is the counterpart of isolation in physical experiment; each successive later term answers the purpose of synthetic recombination under increasingly complex conditions. Sixth, a complete historical account of the development of any ethical idea or practice would not only enable us to interpret both its cruder and more mature forms, but—what is even more important—would give us insight into the operations and conditions which make for morality, and thus afford us intellectual tools for attacking other moral facts. Seventh, in analogy with the results flowing in physical sciences from intellectual control, we have every reason to suppose that the successful execution of this mode of approach would yield also fruit in practical control: that is, knowledge of means by which individual and corporate conduct might be modified in desirable directions. If we get knowledge of a process of generation, we get knowledge of how to proceed in getting a desired result.

I have endeavored in this paper simply to show that either morality must remain outside the sphere of science, or be approached and attacked by the historical method. This is what I mean by the 'necessity' of this method. It still remains open to an objector to take the first of the alternatives, and hold that morality is not open to any sort of scientific treatment, and that it is essential to its existence as morality that it should not be so treated. In other words, I have not as yet discussed directly the question of what the bearing of the application of the historical method, as scientific mode of approach, is upon the value or validity of distinctively moral phenomena. To that problem, accordingly, my next article will be devoted. What does this method do for morality as morality, and how? I shall endeavor to show that the method not only does not destroy distinctively ethical values, but that it supplies them with an added sanction.

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THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE SOCIAL VALUE SERIES.

PART I.

THROUGHOUT the history of philosophy the great systematic conceptions of value have been animated by one of two not uncertain *motifs*. Either the good is identified with the real, *i. e.*, values are conceived to flow out of the metaphysical determination of the real; or the ethical consciousness, having determined its values, proceeds to identify the real with these. Spinoza's system is a typical example of the first of these methods, and its inadequate treatment of ethical values is a significant consequence of his procedure. On the other hand, Plato's ethical idealism is forced to find in the phenomena of the real world the values with which he comes to his problem. In both cases fundamental difficulties ensue. The latter procedure involves the discovery of degrees of reality to correspond to the grades of value; while the method which starts with a determination of the real, and therefrom deduces its concepts of value, is prone to deny the degrees of value affirmed by the valuing consciousness. In either case, the thinker is likely to be left with a stock of illusions—in the one case, values which remain ungrounded; in the other, grades of reality which turn out to be illusory.

Now, despite the advance in detail of treatment, these two methods have remained relatively constant in the history of thought. It is maintained, according to the latter method, that to the consciousness of value there must correspond a moral world order, the detailed working out of which constitutes a ground or sanction for the values of the individual. The principle of 'equivalence in values' in the subjective consciousness, it is thought, can be seen working itself out in the objective world order in an eternal principle of justice. The principle of infinite 'increase of value,' which is a cardinal postulate of the individual order of values, it is held, manifests itself equally in the objective social order. Thus certain forms

of idealism, eliminating the temporal moment, or minimizing the difficulties which arise out of the fact that the self and its individual value series is phenomenally a process in time occupying but a moment in the larger world order, seek to sanction or ground this individual series in the larger world process. It is clear, however, that even if Green's famous fifth chapter in the third book of the *Prolegomena* represents the ideal truth of human progress, even if, despite temporal mutations in values, there are certain ones ultimately permanent, such a view nevertheless ignores the essential problem of any individual self at any given time in history. For it ignores the mutations of value due to causal and economic laws, and it is precisely with these mutations that the individual consciousness must be concerned if it is to get its sanction, in any sense, out of the objective series or world order. The system of social values is a vast one, and, though its general direction may perhaps be metaphysically conceived as in the direction of the attainment of permanent values and of infinite increase of value, yet its actual curve shows many depressions, and it may be in one of these depressions that the entire individual series runs its course. The individual must express his meaning, affirm his values; and the problem remains to discover to what extent the social objective series, abstracted as a system of nature in time, admits of this expression, this affirmation. There are reasons for thinking that the phenomenal applications in time, of the principles of the individual value series, may involve contradictions which argue for a relative indifference of the two series to each other.

The other method of procedure approaches the problem, as we have seen, in the reverse order. It starts with the system of nature and its laws, with the real in its deterministic aspect, and seeks to reduce the values of the individual to aspects or phases of these laws. Such meanings or values as it does not find therein realized it calls illusory. Now, while not differing in principle from the earlier doctrines of the relativity of values, more recent theories of value have developed certain details of formulation, which have an important bearing upon this general question of the relation of the individual to the social value

series. The monistic tendency in science has sought in turn to show that objective social values are governed by the same laws as economic values, and that economic laws are but aspects of larger biological processes. Such thinkers as Simmel and Ehrenfels look upon the principles of marginal and final utility as applicable directly to objective social values. For value is determined by affective dispositions, and with the empirical modifications of these occur mutations of value. Since the affective and volitional dispositions corresponding to social and ethical goods, are subject to the same physiological and psychological laws as those corresponding to economic goods, ethical valuation is subject to laws analogous to those that rule in the economic sphere. The consequence of this is that any given phenomenal value, as an objective value in the social order, is a function of objective forces abstracted from the valuing selves, like the abstractions, 'supply' and 'demand' in economics. As such, the value is part of a system of nature, and therefore cannot be conceived as in any way permanent or absolute. Any given phenomenal value, *e. g.* the social worth set upon a virtuous disposition of the will, as a phenomenon of the objective social order, cannot conceivably have its nature described in terms of a progressive, irreversible series of values, as, for instance, an approximation of the virtue to the absolute by a progressive growth in extension and intension, as described by Green. Any given worth, precisely because it is phenomenal and depends upon these phenomenal conditions, is subject to the principle of limiting value. All social ethical values have a reversible serial order. They rise and decline. If we could, so to speak, cut a cross section through the social consciousness at any time, just as in a cross section of the individual consciousness we find some states appearing, others in the center of consciousness, and still others just disappearing, so in the social consciousness we should find three classes of values, those that are aspiring, those that are normal, and still others that are outlived. It follows that, though the more general and abstract worths—such as the moral activities that are described by the virtues—may have indefinitely longer periods of endurance, there are, nevertheless, no values, in any

sense absolute, to be found in the social order. As a consequence, the principle of 'infinite increase of value' finds no objective expression in the social series. The individual value series finds in the social order, as a system of nature, no ground, no sanction for making absolute any given worth; in fact, any attempt to apply any such conception leads to contradictions. Nor does the principle of 'equivalence of value' which underlies the concept of justice, get any sanction in the objective order, conceived as a system of nature.

Now, granting for the sake of argument, this method continues, that the inner meaning of the ethical Self, as an individual series, is this progression in the direction of infinite increase of value, it could not possibly apply its principle to any particular phenomenal social value without developing contradictions. Let us first conceive this increase of value in terms of the universalization of an idea, or of an affective or volitional disposition. No matter how general or abstract this valued disposition or idea be conceived, its universalization has only subjective value. When introduced into the objective causal nexus, its universalization would destroy its value, just as surely as the increase of the quantity of a good destroys or diminishes the economic value of the same. Thus, while altruism, because of our constitutional lack of it, as an attitude of an individual might be conceived as increased indefinitely, yet as a good in society, its value rests upon the lack of it, and its increase indefinitely would of necessity lead to the recognition of egoism as a virtue. This, Meinong expresses by distinguishing between *Steigerungs-fähiger* and *nicht-Steigerungsfähiger Altruismus*. Nor is the case much better for a purely material interpretation of this principle in terms of increase of pleasure. To say nothing of the difficulty of reconciling a continuous increase of pleasure with its equality of distribution, a difficulty which hedonism always meets when it attempts to do justice to the inner meanings of the ethical subject, the more fundamental difficulty arises, namely, whether natural laws make conceivable any real increase of pleasure in the social series, whether all our activity is not rather concerned with its redistribution. Does not then, Simmel asks, our attempt to apply any

such subjective principle of increase of value to any particular object of value in the social consciousness turn out to be irrational, illusory?

We are here brought face to face with an ultimate problem of methodology. The problem in its simplest form is this: Whatever a value may be for an individual, whatever may be the grounds of his valuation, whatever of absolute and infinite meaning it may for him seem to contain, must it not, as soon as it takes its place as a phenomenon, as a function of forces of valuation, conceived as part of an external system of nature, follow causal laws, and thus suffer a fate which is for him irrational or in some sense meaningless and indifferent? In the light of the foregoing reflections, either this question may be asked, or the alternative one, viz., whether the postulates of absolute objective values and of infinite increase of value which characterize the individual consciousness are not from the larger point of view of the system of nature, illusory. The latter of these alternatives is clearly accepted by Ehrenfels. Even in the subject an indefinite increase of a given phenomenal value, say a virtuous disposition, is impossible on account of the working of these laws which we have been considering. Nay more—even the power of valuing itself, as a function, is limited by the economy of the nervous system to modifications of which the affective dispositions must ultimately be reduced, and from which the laws of mutation of values spring. As valuation involves energy, and the nervous energy is limited, the increase of the sense of value is itself limited. All absolute valuation of an individual Ehrenfels conceives as springing out of an æsthetic isolation of the individual, which may have a utility for the social order, but which has no ultimate epistemological significance. On the other hand, there are thinkers, such as Simmel, who find in this unique characteristic of the individual value series, its postulate of infinite increase of value, a relative truth. While unable, in view of their recognition of these laws which govern the fate of objective social values and the mutations of value that follow, to conceive of the subject applying its inmost meaning to any given phenomenal content of social value, nevertheless they believe that there may be an

indefinite increase of energy of valuation in the subject. The moral end cannot be formulated in terms of any social content, however abstract, but only in terms of the function of the subject. The imperative, though an irreducible characteristic of the individual value series, cannot be applied in any absolute sense to any given social content without involving contradictions. Yet this imperative character of the individual value series expresses itself in continuous *Zweck-setzung*, however phenomenal and ephemeral the particular ends may be, and in this very function the essence of individual morality is found. Inner valuation occupies the unique position of getting its content out of reality, but at the same time, of forever negating the real in favor of new values which in turn determine reality itself.[1] So also Krueger sees in the mere functional end of "highest possible energy of valuation," independent of content, the essence of the ethical life.

We have considered thus at length these two possible methods of determining values, their consequences and difficulties, in order that we may properly understand and estimate a third possible position, which is receiving recognition at the present time. We have, accordingly, contrasted the individual series of the Self, and its peculiar meaning as a progressive irreversible series with reference to an imperative absolute, with the reversible serial order, which characterizes the life history of any phenomenal content of social valuation, in order that we may raise the question whether, instead of being related as mutually supplementary or contradictory, these series may not indeed be in some sense mutually indifferent. The system of objective values, conceived as a system of nature, has shown itself in certain respects refractory to the affirmation of the principles of individual valuation, at least in so far as the individual seeks in the system of nature a sanction for the absolute moment in his sense of value. May there not be a sense in which they are mutually indifferent to each other?

A certain pragmatic indifference of the individual sense of value to the consequences of a deterministic science is in the air. Those who have read Maeterlinck's essays on justice[2] have

[1] Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moral-Wissenschaft*, Vol. II, p. 310.

[2] Among others, "The Mystery of Justice," *North Am. Review*, Jan., 1902.

doubtless been impressed with this effort of the dramatic sense to free itself from the old objective and quasi-physical concept of justice, which has been the backbone of so much of the tragic. Having given up the idea of an objective, social, or metaphysical justice, he takes refuge in an inner mystical conception which makes justice indifferent to the system of nature. But this conception, that the indifference of nature to the ethical values of the individual Self may be made an hypothesis upon which to construct an idealistic theory of values, has actually received philosophical expression in the two great representatives of the most modern philosophy of value. Nietzsche and Guyau, different as are the values which they succeed in finally affirming, are at one on this fundamental point, that what are illusions from the standpoint of the system of nature are, in the system of values, fundamentally true. The usefulness of these values for life is their ultimate test. Indifferent to the causality of history and nature alike, and also to the social values which this social system has produced, the individual subject of values is to find in the nature of his own series its sufficient reason and justification. But while Nietzsche's pragmatic affirmation of this doctrine represents a significant undercurrent in thought, Guyau's formulation is of more importance for our study, because he brings the problem down to the plane of an epistemological examination of the valuing consciousness itself. In his study of morality,[1] he examines, in turn, the optimistic and pessimistic views of the world order, as hypothetical bases of ethical values. He concludes that neither of these, were it capable of rational proof, as it is not, is, in so far as it is a theory of the system of nature objectively viewed, a sufficient ground for ethical values.

In consequence of contradictions similar to those discussed above, he decides in favor of the hypothesis of "indifference of ethical values to the system of nature." The sanction of the individual's ethical values is to be found alone in the concrete activity of life itself, in life not viewed as a phenomenon to be judged externally as part of a system of nature, but as containing

[1] *Esquise d'une moral sans obligation ni sanction*, Bk. I, Chap. 3; Bk. III, Chap. 1.

in itself its own principle of valuation, its own sufficiency. The consequence of this principle of indifference is the banishment from the sphere of ethical values of the principles of causal sanction and of distributive justice. In so far as under these rubrics the system of nature is conceived to be the source of sanction of individual ethical values, our conception is in error. There is no immediate bond, either causal or rational, between ethical values as values and social values as part of a system of nature. Having handed over to a morally indifferent nature, manifesting itself in economic laws, all the truth there is in the quantitative conceptions of causal sanction and distributive justice, he seeks to construct out of the inner dialectic of the processes of life itself, as a more ultimate reality than the abstractions of external nature, its own sufficient reason. This inner norm, independent of the fate of values in the system of nature, is found in increased intensity of life, volitional, emotional, and intellectual, which has as its correlative and condition the most complete expansion. In interpreting individual value as a function of activity, and indeed as a function of these two processes of intensity and expansion, he does not, it is to be observed, conceive of intensity and expansion as related to each other as in the logic of formal thought, nor yet as the intensity and extensity of demand and supply in the economy of material goods. They do not vary inversely but directly. Guyau clearly conceives of the possibility of an indefinite increase of sympathy both in intensity and extension, and, through the medium of the æsthetic values, without the point of satiety, of an indefinite increase of social synergy. This position is similar to that taken by Tarde in a recent article in the *Revue Philosophique*, where he argues for an indefinite increase of energy of social belief and confidence, as possible through the development of æsthetic goods in which satisfaction is not limited by the economic laws of consumption.

That which interests us in this doctrine of Guyau is his effort to recognize the characteristic law of the Self's individual value series, and at the same time to do justice to the causal principles that rule the social value series when abstracted as a part of the system of nature. This characteristic law he defines as a con-

comitant increase in both intensity and expansion of life, of the volitional and affective dispositions of the subject. The sufficient reason of this individual series, if sufficient reason it may be called, consists precisely in this function. No value of the subject can find its sanction in the content of the social series. The fate of no objective value can essentially affect the significance of the subject's value series. The theory expressly discards all objective sanction whether causal or rational. Now, whatever may be the arguments for abandoning the conception of objective sanctions, they can all be traced back to contradictions which arise necessarily out of the attempt to carry principles of inner valuation over into the objective series conceived as a system of nature. An examination of these principles from a more logical point of view will enable us to understand the epistemological meaning of a theory of indifference.

The evaluating consciousness discloses two principles of valuation, 'equivalence of value,' and 'increase of value.' An act of volition may get its ground or sanction by establishing an equivalence of value between the act and some already accepted value. This equivalence may be conceived as being established merely between processes of the subject, as for instance, equivalence in the intension and extension of ideas or sentiments, or as an equivalence between a subjective and an objective value. There is also a second aspect of the sanctioning consciousness which consists in the imputation of increase of value to the willing subject, or his states of consciousness, on the assumption of the possibility of continuous increase of value. Now, the difficulties involved in conceiving these principles of sanction as depending for their meaning and their realization upon the causal constitution of the objective social value series, may be stated in the following general terms. In the first place, the principle of 'equivalence of values,' if it contemplates the establishment of equivalences between individual and social values, therefore, objective, causal, sanction and distributive justice, involves the reduction of both series to an abstract quantitative or logical middle term. Both of the classical doctrines of sanction follow this procedure. The hedonistic doctrine seeks to find in

the abstraction of a quantitatively determinable pleasure-continuum the middle term to which it may reduce the values of each series. The rationalistic doctrine, on the other hand, in order to get an objective measure which shall establish an equivalence between subjective and objective values, conceives of the external order as a system of rational universals, and determines the degree of inner value by the extent to which compulsory universals are present in consciousness. It is clear that in either case we have to do with an abstraction, which, in order to get a common term for the two different series, ignores characteristic qualities of the subjective series. In the interests of the quantitative conception, hedonism abstracts from the second, inner, aspect of the valued states of the subject, namely, their breadth and depth in the personality, the extent to which they implicate the entire experience of the subject. To measure the value of a sentiment or disposition of a subject in terms of its objective universality or capability of universalization, is again to abstract wholly from the element of affective intensity, which, as a condition of all volition, is involved in all valuation. We cannot escape the conclusion that both of these doctrines of objective sanction are built upon abstractions; that the establishment of equivalences of value, which constitutes the sufficient reason of ethical valuation, is not possible between subjective and objective values, but is rather a process of the valuing subject alone, among his own states.[1]

In the second place, if these equivalences are to be established between the values of the individual and social series, then for the second principle of progressive imputation of value to get any meaning, side by side with the subjective imputation of the developing personality, there must be a corresponding increase of value, in terms either of quantity or universality, ascribed to the latter's phenomenal acts as social goods. That is, with the *Steigerungs-fähigkeit* of his disposition should follow a corresponding *Steigerungs-fähigkeit* of the social value or good. The logical consequences of this external doctrine of sanction are

[1] For a subtle discussion of the contradictions in the doctrine of objective sanctions, see Guyau, *Esquise d'une moral, etc.*, Bk. III, Chaps. 1 and 2.

therefore disastrous for this second principle of inner sanction. If the "paradox of value," whether in its hedonistic or energistic interpretation, is forever setting limits to the development and expansion of objective values, and if the individual values are bound by the principle of equivalence to the fate of the external values, then only one conclusion is possible, namely, that of Ehrenfels:[1] the principle of progressive imputation of values has no real basis either in the individual or social series, but is rather an æsthetic illusion, the reason for which is to be found in the æsthetic isolation of the bearer of values, the Self, from the system of nature.

We are brought finally to the point where we see that these two principles when abstracted from the subject of valuation and carried over into an external system of nature, are in mutual contradiction, and that this reduces one or both to illusion. This comes out especially clearly in the difficulties encountered in the attempt of Sidgwick to coördinate justice and benevolence. The practical difficulties involved in reconciling justice and benevolence have a profound logical basis. For while distributive justice contemplates merely the establishment of ideal equivalences between the individual's sense of value and the objective values of the social consciousness, on the basis of a mediating quantitative, conception, benevolence has in mind the simple increase of value, as for instance quantity of pleasure in the social series, irrespective of these equivalences. If distributive justice is conceived as an objective apportionment of goods, a correspondence of objective and subjective values, then it implies the existence of a *given* fixed quantum of some abstract substratum of values, say pleasure, in order that the quantitative process may get started. On the other hand, benevolence, hedonistically interpreted, implies the possibility of an indefinite increase of this substratum of pleasure. But these two assumptions are in contradiction. It is not surprising then that Sidgwick should have felt himself forced to subordinate justice to benevolence, in fact to reduce the former to a purely economic rôle. He makes it clear to us that, to say nothing of the abstractions of freedom

[1] *System der Werththeorie*, Bd. II, p. 56.

and opportunity, not even pleasure is a sufficiently abstract and homogeneous term to admit of an *a priori* application of distributive justice.

Benevolence, or the principle of increase, becomes then the dominating concept in his system, and justice, or equivalence, is conceived as being worked out by the economic laws of supply and demand. In fact, he seeks to reduce the idea of justice itself to a generalization of the impulses to reward favors and return injuries in kind. "Whenever a man is said to deserve a reward for service to society, the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him in order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards." Thus is the idea of desert substituted for that of abstract equality, and thus also is justice handed over to the economic system of nature. It is, it will be observed, the same conclusion reached by Guyau, *i. e.*, that distributive justice is really not an ethical principle at all, but merely an economic conception. *Le principe: à chacun selon ses œuvres, est un simple principe économique; il résume fort bien l'ideal de la justice commutative et des contrats sociaux, nullement celui d'une justice absolue qui domminent à chacun selon son intention morale.* And it is in view of such considerations that Guyau argues for an indifference of ethical values to the working out of values in the external world order.

This concept of the indifference of ethical values to nature, when closely examined, resolves itself then into the hypothesis of a relative indifference of two aspects of the fundamental principle of rational sufficiency. The valuing, sanctioning, consciousness, since it springs ultimately out of a striving will, the very principle of whose being is to rise, in the terms of Spinoza to a higher degree of reality, in the terms of the hedonists to higher degrees of pleasure, in the words of the idealists to higher degrees of perfection, can pass judgments ultimately only on the assumption of the possibility of an infinite series of progressive values. On the other hand, the external system of nature, abstracted from the volitional source of valuation, is ultimately conceived in terms of the causal principle of mere equivalence of forces, which is found to have its roots ultimately in a quantitative conception

which denies increase of value and energy, and contemplates merely transformation, displacement, and re-arrangement. In my monograph, *History of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, etc.*, it was pointed out that while this principle arose in an identification of reality and value, in a metaphysical attempt to evaluate the total world, the entire history of reflection upon the principle has nevertheless resulted in a tendency to eliminate the worth-categories in favor of a mechanization of the principle. This ejection of the worth-categories resulted ultimately in a formulation, for the purposes of logic, of a dualistic application of the law. On the one hand, in the terms of Wundt, the Law of Ground reduces itself, in its application to external reality, to a principle of equivalence of forces, based upon conservation of energy. On the other hand, the inner sufficiency of judgment and will is concerned with equivalences of value, and assumes an infinite increase of mental energy. The latter is the inner sufficiency of the will, the former is an application of the principle of sufficiency to a system of nature abstracted from the inner meaning and sufficiency. Whatever be their ultimate union in an idealistic metaphysic, methodologically they remain dualistic.

Now, that there is an ultimate dualism in reason, and, consequently an ultimate difference of these two series of values, is highly improbable. Certainly the present writer, fresh from the reading of Professor Royce's second volume of *The World and the Individual*, has no desire so to argue. At the same time, as a methodological principle, this hypothesis of the relative indifference of the individual series of values, as a series, to the content and mutations of content in the social series, may be made fruitful for the understanding of certain questions that arise on the lower plane of the scientific study of ethical values. It deserves consideration in the same manner as the principle of psycho-physical parallelism—as an epistemological *modus vivendi*. It is the purpose of the second portion of this paper to seek to discover the precise meaning that may be given to this concept of indifference, and the extent of its application. This will involve a critical study of the concept of simultaneous increase in inten-

sity and expansion (Guyau), intension and extension (Bradley), as a category of the Self, or as the law of the individual value series, and also lead to an attempt to bring it into harmony with the laws of objective value.

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THE COMMON-SENSE VIEW OF REALITY.

THE question as to the extent and validity of human knowledge is one so fundamental to philosophy, that it would seem that thought can never abandon the problem so long as metaphysics and speculative inquiry shall exist. Throughout the entire history of philosophy, the epistemological query is continually raised with a persistence that would seem to indicate that this question is the very life-blood of metaphysics itself, and that a search for ultimate truth must of necessity go hand in hand with a criticism of the faculty that seeks for truth. That such criticism is proper and healthful it would be rash to deny. Yet, on the other hand, it may be maintained that epistemology has too often gone beyond its legitimate limits, and, instead of being a valuable aid in the acquisition of truth, has introduced confusion and uncertainty into the problem. It is the purpose of this paper to consider one point, at least, in which the theory of knowledge has led to no helpful conclusion, but has rather raised difficulties where they should not exist, or at least has increased the difficulties which of necessity arise. In particular, it is the aim of the present discussion to consider that dispute of long standing between epistemology and the so-called common-sense view of the external world. This paper accordingly divides itself into four sections, namely: (1) An exposition of the common-sense view of external reality; (2) A brief outline of the epistemological problem in philosophy; (3) A consideration of certain fundamental contradictions in the attack of epistemology on the common-sense view of the world; (4) An attempt to suggest certain lines along which the solution of these contradictions may proceed.

Perhaps the best way to get at the fundamental conception concerning reality, which is involved in the common-sense view of the world, is to consider for a moment its genesis in the child and in the race. Such a proposal may at first glance seem rash, especially in reference to the child, since it may with propriety be urged that too little is known of the early conscious

life of the individual to warrant any conclusions from such uncertain and insufficient data. On the whole, this may be true; yet it seems possible to draw conclusions in a general way from the phenomena of infant conscious life. It is not an unwarranted assumption that the psychical state of early infancy is more of a chaos than a cosmos. It is a condition that may be more appropriately described as 'sciousness than consciousness. It is a state of nebulosity in which there is no fixed point of radiation, no central sun. At this stage of development it is nonsense to talk about the self or the non-self, egoism or altruism, the individual or the external world, for neither exist as far as the child is concerned. We must conclude that the psychical life is made up of many discrete elements which have at the most a minimal connection. If we may be pardoned for using a Kantian phrase, apperception plays no part in the dawning consciousness. Gradually, however, the *psyche* unfolds, and the individual by degrees becomes conscious of two great realities, neither of which he doubts for a moment, the self and the non-self. The chaos has now become a cosmos, which circles about two opposing suns, the individual and the external world. But how does this transition take place? What are the causes that lead to this breaking up and grouping of the psychical series? The answer which this paper would give to this query is that the cause is the opposition which the external world presents to the unconscious impulses of the infant organism. Were there no inflexible reality outside of the individual, opposing and limiting it, knowledge of the self and the non-self would never develop. Further, it is through this external opposition which confronts the infant that he learns to distinguish between the impressions and impulses which go to make up his psychical states. Gradually, though very slowly, he begins to separate fact from fancy, dream from awaking, reality from delusion, using as a criterion for this distinction the conditions and opposition which meet him on all sides as he seeks to unfold his being. What then is external reality for the child: what then is fact? The answer must be, that which has a practical bearing upon his existence; that which can act causally upon his organism. That which has for him an interest is

the real and the only real. Apart from this *practical* standard there is no measure for reality, there is no meaning to the term.

The familiar saying, "the burnt child fears the fire," illustrates the meaning of reality from the practical standpoint. The child will, without hesitation, touch that which he may imagine in play is hot; but the glowing stove has for him a reality determined purely by practical experience. And what is true of the child is to a great degree true of the race in its earliest stages of development. The external world is a practical world. Not that fancy and imagination do not play an important rôle, but they are continually being eliminated and corrected through practical experience. As the child and the race advance, the criterion of practicability becomes more and more pronounced, unless turned aside and subverted by the introduction of speculative thinking, and even then, while such philosophizing may have a great effect upon the thinking of a people, history has shown that it has a relatively slight influence upon their conduct. To sum up in brief, it is this determination of the external world from the *practical* standpoint, from the standpoint of *interest*, that may be defined as the common-sense view of reality.

With whatever tenacity the common-sense view may have held its place in ordinary thinking, the history of philosophy shows that from the very beginning speculation broke away from the naïve conception of reality in an attempt to harmonize the contradictions between logical thinking and perception. Even before systematic philosophy had developed in Greece, the Eastern sages had declared that the whole world of sense was illusion, that phenomena were but the veil of maya, that life itself was a dream, and its goal was Nirvana. The first attempt at systematic thinking, that of the Milesian school, seems to have been prompted by a desire to find in the ἀρχή a resting place for thought beyond immediate externality, though there seems to be here no direct break with the popular conception concerning the material universe. This break was not, however, long delayed. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides speak of the illusion of the senses; while Zeno attempted with his refined logic to refute all assertion of the multiplicity and changeability of being. For the Pythag-

oreans, number was the true being, and Leucippus is alleged to have developed the theory of the subjective character of the sense-qualities.

With the second period of Greek philosophy, the break between the popular and the speculative view of the world is completed. The Sophists aimed at the destruction of all knowledge, and tried to reduce everything to individual opinion. Protagoras declared that man was the measure of all things, and denied universal validity. Gorgias maintained that both being and non-being were contradictory terms, and that nothing existed. Further, he declared that if there were anything it could not be known, and even if it could be known it could not be taught. In such an extreme attitude, thought had of course defeated itself, and the search for truth ended in a universal negation. The edifice which the Sophists destroyed Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, tried to rebuild, but not with perfect success. Socrates does not attempt to gain insight into nature, neither does he find his science at all times sufficient to solve ethical problems, but is compelled to call to his aid the *daimonion* to determine difficult courses of action. Plato starts with an acknowledgment that perception can yield no knowledge, and turns his back on the world of sense to view the pure ideas. Aristotle returns in part to phenomena, yet he denies a complete knowledge of nature as such, and, since he considers matter as introducing something contingent and accidental, he finds in intuitive reason, not in demonstration, the most perfect revelation of truth.

Post-Aristotelian philosophy sought knowledge mainly for practical purposes, but was far from successful in this search. It is during this period that scepticism re-asserts itself with great vigor, and holds to the proposition that both thought and perception possess absolute relativity. The Stoics, while positing a metaphysical monism, fall into an ethical dualism, finding in the nature of the individual something contrary to the highest impulses and to reason. The Epicurean position may be characterized as a blending of scepticism and positivism. In the last period of Greek philosophy, mankind sought refuge from relativity and doubt in a divine certainty. Revelation takes the place of reason, and is even some-

times contrary to it; *Credibile est quia ineptum est; certum est, quia impossibile est—credo quia absurdum*, says Tertullian.

No time need be spent in considering the philosophy of the middle ages with its dogmatism and its poor logic. Not that it did not at times wrestle with mighty problems, nor that it did not attempt at times, in men like Roger Bacon, to get at real science. On the whole, however, it is but the threshing of old straw.

With the dawn of modern philosophy came new energy and new hopes. The disappointing results of so fair a promise are too well known to be dwelt upon in detail. From the very start, epistemology holds the central position. Descartes begins with scepticism, only to end in dogmatism. Schopenhauer has not come far from the truth when he writes: "Descartes was a remarkable intellect, and when one considers the age in which he lived he achieved much. But if we leave this consideration aside, and measure him by his boasted emancipation of thought from all its chains, and his would-be inauguration of a new period of independent research, we shall find with all his scepticism, which was destitute of any real earnestness, and therefore quickly and readily yielding—that he indeed made as though he were about to strike off the chains of indoctrinate opinion that bound his age and nation; but that this was merely a pretence, assumed for the purpose of immediately taking them up again and riveting them so much the faster. And thus it is with all his successors till Kant."

Locke's polemic against the Cartesian epistemology, as far as the doctrine of innate ideas is involved, resulted in leaving the knowledge of the external world in an extremely dubious position; while Berkeley, following after, attempts to demolish the conception of corporeal substance; and Hume, developing Locke's doctrine of impressions and ideas, removes all basis from externality and sweeps away without compunction both the material universe and the *res cogitans*, leaving nothing in their places but a bundle of perceptions.

With Hume's conclusions, epistemology seemed to have finally brought an end to philosophy, "killing the mother that engendered it," and speculative thought might well stand aghast in witnessing the astonishing feat of raising one's self by one's

boot straps. But now comes upon the scene the master who is to bring back the lost cosmos, and to restore metaphysics to her once proud position as a science. The professor at Koenigsberg hears the note of scepticism, awakens from his dogmatic slumbers, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is given to the world, and a new era of philosophy is inaugurated.

But have the claims of Kant been realized? Is metaphysics to-day on a more firm foundation than when the author of the *Critique* wrote: "Time was when she was the queen of all the sciences. Now it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her, and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken like Hecuba." Compared with the many devotees of empirical science, how few there are who to-day turn their attention to metaphysics, not because the questions raised are not still of burning interest, but because there is a general despair of reaching any result. Will this condition ever be changed? Possibly, but not until metaphysics has shaken off the incubus of a perverted epistemology, the pursuit of which leaves thought in a hopeless tangle; not until the common-sense view of the world in the form of a critical realism is made the starting-point of a sincere investigation of reality.

In examining more closely the warfare of epistemology upon the common-sense view of reality, a warfare waged for the most part by the aid of logical subtleties, no claim of unfairness can certainly be made if the same logical reasons are used in the defence as are employed in the attack. The history of philosophy shows that this attack upon the reality of the external world has proceeded along two main lines, one empirical, the other *a priori*. While it is not here the purpose to present all the lines of this attack in detail, an attempt will be made to select certain representative positions of epistemology in this controversy, and examine their claims to acceptance. And first, the empirical arguments may be for matters of convenience put under three main categories: (1) Arguments based on the relativity of sense perception; (2) Arguments based on certain phenomena derived from physical science; (3) Arguments based on the construction of the human body, and particularly on the character and ar-

rangement of the nervous system. The logical arguments, though not by any means new in the history of philosophy, find their focus in Kant, and may best be discussed in connection with that philosopher.

Turning our attention for the moment to the empirical proofs against a common-sense view of external reality, we may first consider one typical argument based on the relativity of sense perception. It is urged that the same object appears differently to different individuals, and that it also appears from time to time different to the same individual. To the well and happy man the world looks joyous; to the same man when sick or sorrowful quite the reverse. Therefore it is asserted that objects are not really what we judge them to be for practical purposes. They may, in fact, be quite opposite to our idea of them, or even be complete delusions of the senses—the stuff that dreams are made of. Pausing for a moment to notice the basis on which this argument rests, we may do well to show in passing that the first part of the proof is founded upon a self-contradictory assumption. Passing over the self-evident fact that the exact communication of thought is fraught with the greatest difficulties, and that, therefore, a mere difference in statement as to the appearance of an object does not of necessity involve a difference in physical conditions, we may nevertheless at this point observe that while the argument attempts to prove the relative, or absolute unknowability, or even the non-existence of an external object, it does so only by assuming that another external object, here an individual, is known completely or exactly in so far as that individual expresses a judgment concerning an external object. Otherwise the fact that judgments differ concerning an object presented to the senses could have no force.

In considering the second part of this empirical proof, namely, that the same object appears differently to the same individual at different times and under varying circumstances, it is to be observed that in order that this judgment shall have weight it must be assumed that the object under question is the same object in its different presentations. But what does this assumption really mean? It means that in this object there must be certain quali-

ties which remain unchanged, otherwise the object could not be recognized as identical in diversity. For example, let it be supposed that the object *x* presents certain marks *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, at one time. Now, in order that it may be recognized, the object must at a later time present possibly among other marks as *f*, *g*, *h*, certain of its previous marks as *a*, *b*. Now, it must be assumed that these marks *a* and *b*, are really known, and that they are not purely or even partially subjective. Thus the proof from the relativity of sense perception breaks down of its own weight, since it is based on the assumption that certain sensations are absolute and not relative; but, if it is once admitted that this be true, where can a line be drawn between those qualities that really inhere in the object *x*, and those which are purely or partially subjective? And here it may be observed that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of matter, which developed so early in philosophy, and which is made a central point in the treatment of Locke, is untenable. Extension and hardness are as purely subjective as color and smell, and if the latter do not give us a real knowledge of the object, how can the former?

Passing now to the second point under the empirical proofs against a knowledge of the external world, we pause for a moment to notice certain arguments based on discoveries of modern science. It is said, for example, that we know that what we interpret as color or heat or sound in an object is not color or heat or sound, but certain vibrations in the atmosphere or ether. Therefore, no such a thing as color or heat or sound exists in the object itself, and the common-sense view of the world is here at fault, and the evidence of our senses is discredited. But how do we know that what we call color, for example, exists in the ether as certain mechanical vibrations? We can find out this fact certainly in no other way than through the senses which we seek in other particulars to discredit; but, if our senses err at one point, what guarantee have we that they will not at another, and even at that very point that is essential to our proof? Here again the attack upon the common-sense view of reality rests on a self-contradiction. 'But surely,' we say, 'our knowledge of the structure of the human body shows beyond a doubt that

many changes take place before the affecting object produces an effective state in the brain. The stimulus must pass up the afferent nerve before it can reach the cortex, and this stimulus must be quite different from the object and from the notion which the individual forms of this object. Hence, between perception and reality there must be a great gulf, or if the two should chance to agree, we can have no knowledge of such agreement, and the fact cannot help us.' Schopenhauer, in his attempt to prove the unreality of the external world, states this argument very clearly in the second book of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. "The subjective and the objective," writes the philosopher, "constitute no continuum, that which is immediately known is limited by the skin, or rather by the external end of the nerves which lead out from the cerebral system. Within lies a world of which we have no other knowledge than through pictures in our head." Here the subjectivity of the impressions of sense is attempted to be proved by a process of reasoning based on the construction of the human body, but, unfortunately for Schopenhauer's contention, our bodies are impressions from the idealist's standpoint as purely subjective as the forest, the field, or the sky. It is evident that such an argument can have weight only when we assume that we possess a knowledge of the construction of our bodies not derived through empirical means. Schopenhauer has credited man with a knowledge of certain things belonging to the external world (here the brain and the nerves), in order to prove that the external world is removed entirely from our knowledge. The same objection to this argument holds, even if it is not assumed that external reality is completely unknowable. If it is unknowable or deceptive in any part, what criterion have we of judging in what part it yields the truth? Certainly we have no right to assume that our senses deceive us at certain points, when at others they reveal reality.

Having thus briefly touched upon certain attempted proofs from the empirical side to overthrow a thorough-going belief in the external world, we may pass to the *a priori* side. Here the aim will not be made to canvass all the arguments, but attention will be chiefly confined to Kant's great attempt to work out a

satisfactory epistemology—one that would vindicate the claims of the subject to a constitutive part in the world of phenomena, and yet, on the other hand, would not reduce the world without to a mere dream. This attempt resulted in the well-known distinction between the form and content of knowledge. On the one side stand the forms of space and time, the categories of the understanding, and the ideals of reason; on the other an unknown and unknowable x, the irreducible surd of knowledge, the sole representative of the world of sense. But why does Kant leave the x, the thing-in-itself in his philosophy? Because to the thing-in-itself may be attributed, according to his own words, "besides the property of self-phenomenization, a *causality* whose effects are to be met with in the phenomenal world, although it is not itself phenomenon." But in making this admission, Kant overthrows his whole epistemological presuppositions; for his doctrine of the thing-in-itself, a thing out of relation, is a contradiction. Kant's thing-in-itself is really a thing-in-relation. It is the external world (thought deprived of most of the qualities which go to make up our conception of reality) revealed to us through the causal law. It is the stuff that goes to make up our knowledge, that which cannot be reduced to a mere subjective quality. It is, in fact, though hard to recognize at first glance, the remnant of the common-sense view of the world of which even Kant with all his logic could not get rid. Like the ghost of Banquo, it rises unbidden at the feast of reason, and continually demands its right. Kant would limit the causal law to the work of the understanding, but he is continually obliged to make it transcend the individual and pass over to his so-called thing-in-itself. It is clear where Kant got his notion of the thing-in-itself, being unable to limit the causal law to a purely subjective application; and it is equally clear why he is obliged to keep it in his philosophy, since he does not wish to be classed as a solipsist. Kant, in his *Prolegomena*, §13, Remark II, writes the following:

"Inasmuch as the senses never enable us to cognize, not even in one single point, the things-in-themselves, but only their phenomena, while these are mere presentations of sensibility; all bodies, together with the space in which they are found, must be

held to be nothing but mere presentations, existing nowhere but in our thoughts." Now is this not the plainest idealism? It would seem as if such was the case, and that Kant must of necessity take a position similar to that of Berkeley or Fichte. This he would have been forced to do, but for the contradiction above referred to. He attempts to defend himself from the charge of idealism as follows:

"Idealism consists in the assertion that there exists none but thinking entities; the other things we think we perceive in intuition, being only presentations of the thinking entity, to which no object outside the latter can correspond. I say, on the contrary, things are given as objects discoverable to our senses, external to us, but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing; we know only their phenomena."

This argument may at first seem plausible, but on closer examination it will be found to be based on a fallacy. If we know the things that exist at all, we know more than mere phenomona. The conception of thing is not something so simple that it can be reduced to an x in philosophy. The real fact seems to be not that we know phenomena, but that we know things through phenomena. To sum up in brief, Kant's epistemology, which consists in a distinction between the thing-in-itself and phenomena, breaks down because he is obliged to pass from pure subjectivity to objectivity, and does this by the use of the causal law, a transcendental principle. But if the causal law cannot be limited to a subjective application, by what right does Kant impose this restriction upon the forms of space and time and the categories of the pure understanding? Kant asks in regard to space and time, that if they belong to things-in-themselves, how is it possible to construct their intuition *a priori*, as is the case in pure mathematics? But the question may be raised, on the other hand, how is it possible for the individual to intuit objects under these forms if they have not an objective as well as a subjective reality? The great error in the Kantian point of view, especially as emphasized and developed by the followers of Kant, seems to be that it is assumed that the more the object is categorized by perception and thought the less real it

becomes. Is it not more legitimate to assume that the greater the number of relations, can enter into the object, the more it reveals its true being? On the whole, the study of the epistemology of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, instead of overthrowing the common-sense view of reality, tends to show the necessity of this view to any consistent theory of knowledge.

In conclusion, a purely logical objection to the common-sense view of reality may be noticed. The very conception of knowledge, it is urged, implies that a real knowledge is impossible, since the whole universe divides itself into the two opposing poles of subject and object, and under such circumstances there can be only knowledge in relation. This objection has force, however, only so long as we hold to the doctrine of a thing-in-itself. This doctrine is in its essence self-contradictory, since our very idea of thing implies that it is something in relation either actually or potentially. That which cannot act, cannot enter into a real relation with something else, is indeed nothing. All our notions of matter, substance, thing, are connected with the thought of such action. Think this action away, and you think the thing away. Therefore, it is no objection to real knowledge to know a thing in relation. In fact, any other knowledge would be really no knowledge.

It is to be observed that this relation by which a thing is known is the causal relation, Leibniz's Law of Sufficient Reason. When this position is taken in regard to reality, the difficulties involved in the common-sense view of the world disappear to a great extent. From this standpoint, reality is in proportion to its power to enter into relation, and real knowledge is knowledge of such relation. The test then for truth is a test as to the reality of any supposed relation, and this is a test which the common-sense view of the world is continually making without a theory of knowledge.

Finally, the causal law is not only a firm basis for physical knowledge, but for metaphysics as well. The history of philosophy, if it teaches anything, certainly teaches this, that all fine-spun theories in regard to ultimate being, however perfect they may be logically, lack convincing power if they disregard the Law of

Sufficient Reason. Metaphysics has been only too guilty of this in the past, and if it ever succeeds in adding anything really worthy of knowledge, it must be by accepting the fact that knowledge is knowledge in relation, and that relation finds its sole content in the causal law. An epistemology that denies the ultimate validity of this law, or which discredits a relative knowledge, can only confuse, never aid in the search after ultimate truth.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, HELD AT CHICAGO, IN JOINT SESSION WITH THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ON DECEMBER 31, 1901, AND JANUARY 1, 1902.

Report of the Secretary for 1901.

THE second annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association took place at the University of Chicago, December 31, 1901, and January 1, 1902, in joint session with the American Psychological Association. Five sessions were held, two general, one experimental, and two philosophical, in addition to the business meeting of each society. Professor Royce and Professor Thilly presided alternately at these meetings. The Western Philosophical Association was strongly represented, both in number of members in attendance, and on the program.

At the business session, it was decided to hold the next meeting of the Association at Iowa City, at such date as the Executive Committee may determine. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, University of Minnesota; Vice-President, Arthur Allin, University of Colorado; Secretary-Treasurer, A. Ross Hill, University of Nebraska. G. T. W. Patrick, University of Iowa, and Frank Thilly, University of Missouri, were made members of the Executive Committee.

Thirteen new members were elected, and the Executive Committee was authorized to add to the list of members during the ensuing year the names of such persons of recognized standing in philosophy as might express a desire to become members.

The secretary was authorized to publish proceedings of the meeting, and to distribute copies among the members. The report of the treasurer showed a balance of $7.50 cash on hand, but the dues for 1901 had not been collected from many of the members.

A. Ross Hill,
Secretary-Treasurer.

Abstracts of Papers.

The Theory of Induction. By Frank Thilly.

Some writers distinguish between scientific induction and unscientific induction, but regard both as forms of induction (Bacon, Mill, Veitch, Lotze, Wundt). Others reject the unscientific form or simple enumeration, and accept only that phase of induction which derives from particular facts the law of their necessary connection (Sigwart, Ueberweg, Bosanquet, Shute, Hamelin, Hibben, Creighton). Of these, some identify induction with scientific methods in general, including the forming of hypotheses, deducing their consequences, and verifying them (Sigwart, Jevons in *Principles of Science*, Hamelin). According to some thinkers, only so-called perfect induction is certain; imperfect induction is merely probable. Nearly all agree, however, that induction is grounded on the principle of the uniformity of nature. This principle is interpreted differently by different thinkers, and sometimes called merely by another name. Some speak of it as the principle of identity (Lotze, Kromann, Bosanquet). Some express the same idea by saying the particular is the expression of the universal (Aristotle, Hegel). Some call the principle the principle of necessary connection; the given is necessary (Sigwart, Ueberweg, Hibben, Welton, Creighton). Some identify it with the law of causation (Mill, Jevons, Veitch, B. Erdmann). Moreover, the principle of uniformity is conceived by some as a postulate of our thinking (Sigwart, Lotze, Kromann, Bosanquet, Hibben, Welton, Creighton), by others as the product of experience (Mill, Jevons, B. Erdmann).

The author's conclusions are: (1) Hasty and imperfect induction is just as truly induction as scientific induction. (2) Induction is not limited to the discovery of causal relations. (3) Induction does not discover only the inner necessary relations of things. (4) Induction must not be identified with scientific method in general, for this includes both induction and deduction. The logical thing to do is to restrict the term 'induction' to the process of inferring a general truth from particular instances, and to use another name for the combination of this process with de-

duction. (5) It is not true that we base ourselves on the principle of the uniformity of nature in induction, that is, that inductive inference is really deduction. Induction consists in making the so-called inductive leap, which must be regarded as a natural function of the mind. The principle of uniformity is a late product, the result of induction and not its ground.

The Idealism of Spinoza. By F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

Although the system of Spinoza is based on the recognition of an order of finite, individual things, as opposed to an order of infinite realities, and on the identification of this second order with God, the significance of his philosophy is found rather in the relation he conceives to hold between these two orders. For Spinoza, God can become the real good of man, only as God and man stand related in a way that necessarily involves this good; but this relation can be but one instance of that general relation, which holds between the world of individuals and the world of eternal truth. This relation has quite generally been interpreted as one of identity, and thus Spinoza's system becomes in its essential character pantheistic. This view is supported by many explicit statements of Spinoza, and yet they are generally so qualified that we seem forced to conclude, that the identification of the order of individuals with God can be made only by distinguishing radically different points of view, which cannot logically be brought together. The pantheism thus becomes illogical and mystical.

This conclusion is often thought to exhaust the significance of Spinoza's system, but further inquiry serves to indicate that this estimate is superficial. The qualifications which hedge about the identification of God with the actual, constitute in reality the outlines of an idealistic theory of knowledge. There we find the distinction made with great clearness between the material and the form of knowledge. It is pointed out that individuals can never be *deduced*, and that consequently knowledge of them can never be adequate, Kant would say *objective*, but that knowledge through concepts, *per definitionem*, is adequate. It is further insisted that the only reality which we can be said to know thus

adequately and objectively, is reality as constituted according to principles which have adequate and objective validity. The object of the first book of the *Ethics* is thus to bring out the conclusion, that if we are to speak of any objective reality at all, it can only be that without which nothing can exist objectively or be conceived. Still further, the impossibility of deducing individuals from the nature of this reality, an impossibility upon which Spinoza repeatedly insists, gives to the individual a position logically exterior to the form of adequate knowledge, and thus the ontological position which it has in the great idealistic systems. These propositions constitute a thoroughly idealistic theory of knowledge, even if not worked out with that completeness which in later hands it attained. They involve the conclusion that the objective world is never the given, but always the constructed, a construction, in the light of which experience may take on the form of science, and conduct be justified of its ends.

The Objective Conditions of Thought. By W. M. BRYANT.

The subjective aspect of the theme presents two phases: (1) The primary unity of consciousness; (2) the empirical multiplicity in consciousness. To speak of a "multiple consciousness," is to make use of a self-contradictory form of expression. Only as one, can consciousness know itself as having many phases. Elements of experience can have no existence save as phases in the actual experiences of an individual as a concrete living whole. Consciousness is generic, generative; and its generative acts are: (1) as intellectual, acts of self-definition; (2) as volitional, acts of self-differentiation; (3) as emotional, acts of self-appreciation. The whole is a process at once of self-analysis and of self-synthesis.

Only unitary consciousness is capable of experience. But through its empirical activity individual consciousness becomes aware of contradiction in its experience. To account for this fact, thought, as the unifying function of consciousness in its unitary character, is driven to infer the existence of some sort of reality beyond the individual and empirically developing consciousness. The activities of the latter are seen to bear the

character of responses to external stimuli. That is, through experience, the individual conscious unit discovers itself to be energy-putting-forth-effort, *i. e.*, will—the 'experience' having the form of felt resistance to such effort. Consciousness proves to be not merely contemplative, but purposive, also. But consciousness can interpret such facts only in terms of itself. Self-analysis proves consciousness to be thinking will. The necessary inference of thought is: that whatever offers opposition, stimulus, to consciousness must in its ultimate nature be thinking will also.[1] Only thus can the world really be comprehended. It is idle to speak of a world fundamentally alien to the self as thinking will; since with such world the self could have no relation whatever, and hence could attain no knowledge concerning it. The only world I can know is a world comprehended by and in thought. The objective conditions of my thought, then, can be nothing else than a world which presents in concrete realization the whole system of thought which by my nature as thinking will I am ever striving to render explicit in my own individual being. My nature, therefore, is not merely 'parallel' with that of the world; the two natures are fundamentally one and the same. Thought can rest in nothing short of this ultimate spiritual monism. Self-synthesis, world-synthesis, synthesis of the self with the world—such is the threefold task which thought sets and must set for itself. In its ultimate nature thought is not outwardly conditioned but self-conditioned.

Plato's Fundamental Concepts. By THOMAS M. JOHNSON.

Plato was the greatest of all philosophers. Philosophy is not a mere farrago of thoughts, guesses, and fancies, but is the appetite for and mastery of the Science of First Principles. It does not concern itself with the temporal and sensuous, but deals solely with the permanent and essential. If one wishes to master the Platonic philosophy, he must make the study of it his life's vocation. Among Plato's fundamental concepts are: (1) His idea of the nature of philosophy and the characteristics of the true philosopher. The vital importance of philosophic insight

[1] In my volume, *The World-Energy and its Self-Conservation* (Baker & Taylor, N. Y.), I have attempted the interpretation of the world as an expression of mind.

and practice is shown by the statement that unless rulers become philosophers, or philosophers become rulers, there will be no end of evils for the human race. (2) The essential distinction between knowledge and opinion—one of the most valuable insights in the history of thought. (3) That the soul is the true man, and that the body is merely an instrument which the soul uses during its material environment. That the soul is immortal and eternal in its essence, and exists as a self-conscious entity prior to its descent into the world of time and sense. (4) The doctrine of ideas or eternal paradigms. Ideas are the stable pillars of all truth, and the prolific principles of the universe. Without them there could be no such thing as science; nor, indeed, any real knowledge at all.

The true interpreters of Plato are his genuine disciples, and chiefly those falsely named "Neo-Platonists"—Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Damascius, and the other "refulgent links" of the golden chain of the Platonic Succession. The claims of these philosophers to be the legitimate successors of Plato cannot be intelligently controverted. Greek, the most perfect of all instruments of thought, was their native language, and they knew all its intricacies and phases; all the writings of Plato, and of his immediate disciples (many of which are now lost), were familiar to them; a trustworthy traditional knowledge of his method and oral teachings was in their possession; and, finally, they made the study and interpretation and practice of the Platonic philosophy a life-long vocation.

Plato's Literary Art as a Method of Philosophy. By J. D. Logan.

Hitherto men have regarded Plato as one who was by nature chiefly a poet, and then by influences of environment a philosopher; and who thus effects a union of the intellect and the imagination—of science and religion. Caring little, it is said, for logic or logical methods as such, Plato exploits his literary or poetical gifts for the impassioned presentation of the truth. Indeed Plato is the first and the greatest occidental metaphysician; Aristotle, the first logician. These opinions, however, are in no wise justified by a study of Plato's genius, or of the development

of his philosophical system. His literary art, his poetical idealism, is indeed a necessary expression of his artistic genius ; but it is also a necessary expression of his philosophical genius. It is not a play of art simply for its own sake; it is rather a very methodical artifice, or a method of philosophy. For Plato, as we see him working from the Socratic to the strictly dialectical dialogues, actually constructs, before Aristotle, the ideal of scientific method, and a large number of the formulæ of instrumental logic. But conscious as he is, even to his latest days, of the inadequacy of his powers and data for building a strict system of metaphysics, he veils the defect of true knowledge and the defect of his own method in poetry and mysticism. His literary art is artifice; his poetical idealism, a *tour de force* in agnosticism (natural, not philosophical). Of all this there are numerous proofs. The general proof is the fact that Plato when pressed to solve by his method a concrete physical or cosmological problem, even in the strictly dialectical dialogues, side-tracks the question, changes the subject, or refers his interlocutor, vaguely, to some more sublimated method of discovering the truth, which he himself, at the moment of questioning, cannot exploit. As regards apprehending ultimate reality, Plato must remain merely poetical, mystical—which is but a mode of agnosticism.

The Nature of Time. By JOHN E. BOODIN.

The Epistemological Limitations of Ethical Inquiry. By NORMAN WILDE.

The study of ethics rests upon certain logical principles, common to it with the other sciences, which determine the nature of its problems and its method of explanation. (1) No science has to prove the existence of its own subject matter, but assumes it as part of the common experience of the race, its problem being the understanding of a given material, which it neither constructs nor deduces, but finds. So ethics has not the task of deducing or constructing morality, but of analyzing and interpreting an actually given moral experience, whose reality is a matter of fact, not of theory. (2) No special science has to prove the possibility of

knowledge about its material, but approaches it directly, under the supposition that such knowledge is possible. The scientific problem is to find what is the actual law of any given set of phenomena, not as to whether there *is* such an intelligible law. Similarly, ethics has no need to raise the problem of the intelligibility of moral experience, but may proceed at once to the investigation of the assumed moral cosmos. It is no greater assumption, and no less necessary, that we live in a common world of ends, than that we live in a common world of objects. As rational beings, we act upon the supposition that there is an ideal order of experience, discoverable by thought, both in the spheres of fact and of value, a supposition without which there would be neither knowledge nor conduct. (3) All explanation consists in the exhibition of the common principle involved in any set of particular instances, by means of which these instances are shown as members of a systematic whole. Scientific concepts are the symbols in which the unity in experience is expressed, and must bear definite relation to the experience to be explained, varying with each change in the subject-matter studied. Distinct kinds of experience demand distinct sets of explanatory symbols. Moral experience consists of judgments of a better and worse in conduct, and its spirit is not the scientific judgment that A is the cause of B, but the moral judgment that A is better than B. Ethical explanation must consist in the exhibition of the system of such judgments, and its symbols must be those of value and not of fact. The concept of casuality has no more significance for ethics than has that of obligation for physics. Scientific method in ethics, therefore, though it consists of observation and analysis of actual moral experience, involves the use of explanatory concepts other than those of causality.

Pleasure, Idealism, and Truth in Art. By GEORGE REBEC.

It did not, of course, require Ruskin to show that art admits of the untruth of semblance, fiction. Even here, however, just as in science, a law of parsimony holds sway. Fiction must not be gratuitous; departure from commonplace actuality must not go beyond the requisites of effectively showing forth that essential truth

—truth of principle, type, idea—which is the proper object of art. Yet is it so? How about pleasure as the end? Evidently the coupling of these two equally usual demands of truth and pleasurableness is logically possible only to an optimistic philosophy. Otherwise, the demand for truth must admit the alternative of the non-committal, or the downright sceptical or pessimistic standpoints, in the æsthetic as well as in the philosophic sphere. As a matter of fact, the merely pleasant, *which is not believed to be true*, will not really please at all; because art is not a gratification, so to speak, of the higher animal, but a satisfaction—it may well be a melancholy one—of the sense of reason in us.

Connected with the belief that art must be pleasant, is that of its ideality. As a selecting and holding to the significant, all cognition is an idealization. In the common usage, however, idealism means a conformity of things to our highest or *absolute* standards. In this sense, clearly, the Hardys, Ibsens, and Zolas are not idealistic. Granting that the artist, to be an artist, is obliged, like the philosopher, *to take an attitude towards the ultimate demands of the mind*, yet as regards the *gratification* of those demands, why should he not be allowed the latitude of a Comte, Schopenhauer, or Hume, who still are recognized as genuine philosophers? Surely it is a poor species of the beautiful that would be content to be ranked as a narcotic. In the idealism of art, as in the pleasurableness, truth is insisted on.

How does truth comport with idealism? As expressions of a subjective need, ideals reveal at least something of the truth of the nature of the subject that puts them forth; so that an art even of absolute affirmations must always possess a certain real truth; as likewise it must retain always a certain serious import. The latter will it especially keep for us, if we believe the artistic to be the final mode of expression, *i. e.*, that the development of mind is not from perception to reflection, but from a primitive perception, through reflection, to a mature, reflection-mediated perception.

We can go a step further. In addition to this 'subjective' truth, our monistically-tempered later philosophy would contend that art is able also to achieve some measure of *indirect* objective truth. This because the mind is itself but a manifestation of the

one Universe, and what throws light on the former, helps likewise to interpret the latter. But may we advance further still, and claim for art the possibility of *direct* objective truth—of direct (essential) reality in the objects themselves which it portrays? Kant would divide ideals, in the ordinary meaning in which we use the term, *i. e.*, subjective norms applied to things, into the finite and objectively verifiable, as, for example, the 'Categories,' and the infinite, absolute ones, such as God, Freedom, and a completely teleological World, which he sets down as objectively not verifiable. Assuming the correctness of this division, we can still say that it is surely the latter sort that at least haunt in mood and suggestion all notable art. Are they futile, so far as finding for them a place among 'things' is concerned?

Not many will carry scepticism to the length of denying that either philosophy or art is able to apprehend real phases or factors in some sort of the absolute truth of things. Is there, nevertheless, such a thing as a stage of truth fulfilled and fully cognized—such a thing, even, as a completely unfolded and completely known system of categories, essential structural outlines of reality? If, with orthodox Hegelians, we answer affirmatively to the mere extent of assenting to a definitely limited body of categories, definitely mastered, obviously there is no reason why we should not grant the ideals of great art the possibility of an absolute finality and an absolute objective verity. But suppose that we look upon the universe as literally inexhaustible, not simply as regards the infinite multiplicity of its 'contingent' particulars, but equally as to the wealth of 'essential' principles which it is capable of disclosing? The case, of course, is not bettered if we do not believe that reality ever can be exhausted in categories, generalities, ideals, art, or any other finite mode of theory, because all involve abstraction, while out of the despised limbo of 'contingency' and residual phenomena left over after abstraction, are always rising to sight new categories and a new history. And suppose now, lastly, that our doubting reaches a greater length still, in that we cannot feel an unconditional objective cogency in necessity of a merely inner, or moral, or subjective, or any other type

divorced from *demonstration*, in the literal sense of *showing forth*, in the world of outer experience; while at the same time we do hold that, over and above all (in this sense) demonstrable ideals, the mind keeps always and irresistibly positing such supreme ideals as God, freedom, and a total world, which, nevertheless, in their last reaches, are ever turning out subjective and indemonstrable; or while, indeed, we hold it to be of the very nature of all ideals to have this indemonstrable residuum, if so we may call it, which, accordingly, like all subjective contents, is constantly liable to revision, correction, and illusoriness. In these circumstances, plainly, the ideality of art—its high vision of the ought-to-be—is not a conclusively true vision, but subject to revision and renewed attempts at demonstration, with the attendant opportunities for renewed doubt or occasional not altogether silly despair over the possibility of demonstration at all. And hence the recurrent opportunities, too, for artistic expressions, not of optimism solely, but of agnosticism, scepticism, and blank negation. The artist-mind, no less than the philosophic, may doubt or repudiate its own idealism.

The Psychology of Play. By ARTHUR ALLIN.

Play may be regarded from three standpoints, viz., Origin, function, and aim.

As to origin, plays may be: (1) Manifestations of instinct or of incomplete instincts (impulses); (2) adult ancestral occupations adapted and modified to suit the child mind; (3) present-day social occupations adapted to suit the child's capacities; and (4) adult social occupations performed with pleasure and with the spirit of mastery. In contradistinction to the doctrine of Groos, the plays of the three last divisions may be in nature acquired rather than hereditary, educational rather than instinctive. These plays are based on habits acquired *de novo*, although in some cases they may be associated with instinctive impulses. A number of examples are cited of each class of play.

As to function, play includes all activities performed with pleasure and the spirit of mastery. Traditional play-forms may at times be most distasteful work and strain. The opposite of

play is hard, joyless work—a *via dolorosa* with nothing but a cross in view. The less self-illusion and deception, and the more business-like attitude there may be in play the better.

As to the aim or importance of play, some play activities are pathological or unsocial, such as gambling, waiting for something to turn up. In general, however, play is an initiation into social practices and habits, and thus possesses a survival- or selection-value. Habits are formed which later may be switched off and attached to other objects and aims needful in the social life of the adult. The house being built may for a time be occupied by the masons and carpenters, but these strange guest-builders soon give place to the tenants for whom the house was originally intended. Throughout play runs the great principle of vicarious stimulation. From the sociological standpoint, the stimuli are comparatively unimportant; the reactions are all-important for the future. Some play activities are, however, recuperative in nature, others are diversional (old people, for instance, "putting in the time"), and others again are instances of Aristotelian *katharsis*.

Play derives great importance, biologically and sociologically speaking, from its connection with the law of increase of plastic endowment; for it eliminates the rigidity of instinctive life and organizes new social habits, thus developing adjustability to a future very complex environment. The terms "instinct of play" and "instinct of imitation" are to be criticised. Individual, concrete reactions of such and such nature, some inherited and some acquired, are to be substituted for these general and misleading terms.

A Method of Measuring Mental Work. By C. E. SEASHORE.

Can mental work be measured? If so, will such measurements have much value for psychology? These two questions were intrepreted and answered in the affirmative in the first part of the paper. Then followed a description of the 'psychergograph,' and explanation of various methods of using it.

In designing the psychergograph, the investigator had set himself the following aim: To devise a means by which one can (1) call forth a relatively simple and definite complex of mental activity; (2) repeat the same demand for any length of time, with-

out interruption; and (3) measure, (*a*) the amount of work done, (*b*) the time taken, (*c*) the quality of the work, and (*d*) fluctuations in speed and quality. To denote the work that may be measured, this setting is a typical illustration: Given one of four known signals, to recognize it and make the corresponding one of four simple responses. The apparatus consists of two distinct parts, the stimulator and the recorder. The stimulator exposes signals, the order of which is determined by chance. The response to one signal calls forth the next, by an electric device, and this may be continued without interruption as far as it proves desirable. The recorder makes a continuous record on telegraph tape showing what response was made to each signal and the duration of each act. From the experimenter's point of view, the operation is completely automatic. He has only to press a button to start the recorder and give the signal to begin. The personal equation of the experimenter is, therefore, completely eliminated. The records are permanent, and may be read at leisure. This machine record is supplemented by full notes both by the experimenter and the observer. The psychergograph is a foot rule, as it were. Its record by itself means nothing, just as a foot of an unknown substance has no meaning, but in the hands of an intelligent experimenter it acquires significance.

All the complications of the usual reaction experiment may be introduced, and then there is the additional possibility of long continued repetition of similar processes without interruption. The bodily movement is reduced to a minimum and constant quantity. The record shows, first, the number of a particular kind of acts performed, second, the time required for each act and for the whole series, and third, a quantitative expression for the quality of the work in terms of the number of errors and the classification of errors. The relativity of such measurements was fully recognized.

The Duration of the Auditory After-Sensation. By MAX MEYER.

The first attempt at measuring the auditory after-sensation was made by Alfred M. Mayer in 1874, with seemingly good success. The result was that the duration of the after-sensation was in-

versely proportional to the vibration frequency. In 1898 another method was employed by Abraham. His result was that the duration of the after-sensation was constant, *i. e.*, entirely independent of the vibration frequency. One of the two methods, therefore, must be fundamentally wrong.

Mayer's method was this (neglecting various smaller modifications): The tone was produced by a tuning fork and conducted through a tube to the ear of the observer. The tube was intersected by a disk with a row of openings, so that at rotation of the disk the tone was heard intermittently; but when the velocity of rotation was sufficiently increased, the tone appeared smooth, because—as Mayer assumed—the after-sensation was as long as the interval between two short tones.

Abraham used an entirely different method. The tone was produced by a siren, of which alternately a number of holes in a row were open and closed. At first glance, it seems possible in this case also to increase the velocity of rotation until the interval between two beats is as short as the after-sensation, when the tone should be smooth. However, the tone will never be smooth in this case, as the intensity of each beat does not abruptly begin and end, but rises and falls in a certain manner. A series of such rising and falling (in intensity) tones cannot appear as a smooth tone, unless the fall of each preceding and the rise of each succeeding tone be perfectly symmetrical, which is quite improbable. Under these circumstances, we cannot make use of smoothness in order to measure the after-sensation. Abraham, therefore, used a siren with two rows of holes, producing two different tones and being so arranged that one tone was sounded while the other paused, and *vice versa*. Then, at rapid rotation of the siren, a trill is heard, but when the pauses are filled up by the after-sensation, no trill is heard but two simultaneous tones. The unavoidable roughness is then without any consequence. The result of this experiment was that the after-sensation is constant, *i. e.*, independent of the pitch.

The wrong method is the one used by Mayer. That the tone becomes smooth when the rotation is rapid enough, is not caused by the pauses being filled up by the after-sensation, as Mayer

assumed, but by an entirely different condition. When the rotation of Mayer's disk is rapid enough, one vibration will pass through unobstructed, the next one will be weakened by the disk; and so on alternately. Then, of course, the tone sensation cannot be alternately strong and weak: two impulses at least (in a higher tone region a few more) are physiologically necessary for the production of a tone sensation. If one of these two is great and the other small, not a succession of a strong and a weak tone is heard, but a single tone of invariable intensity. There is no cause at all for a fluctuation of intensity, and the tone is smooth; but no duration of an after-sensation is measured by this.

We now also comprehend Mayer's—unfounded—assertion that the duration of the after-sensation was inversely proportional to the vibration frequency. If we take a tuning fork an octave higher, and wish to let one vibration pass through the tube unchanged, the next one weakened, etc., we have of course to increase the velocity of rotation twice; but this does not permit any conclusion as to the duration of the after-sensation in the case of this higher tone. In other words, this seemingly beautiful method of Mayer turns out to be no method at all.

A Biological View of Perception. By THADDEUS L. BOLTON.

The inapplicability of the old categories of psychology to modern experimental and comparative methods is generally recognized. The purpose of this paper is to revise one of them in the light of some ideas borrowed from biological study. Much that enters into the perception of an object has been overlooked. The older psychologists, proceeding by the method of analysis, have penetrated only so far as to discover the elements contributed by the direct afferent currents initiated by the object presented. These are the most obvious, as well as most superficial elements. The active part of perception needs to be emphasized, the part which arises through the reaction of the organism upon the object. When we trace perception down in the animal scale to its earliest beginnings, we find it gradually fading into automatic and instinctive performances. Perception reduced to its

lowest term is an act, and as such, it is synonymous with instinct and emotion. Objects that arouse no instinctive or emotional response are perforce unperceived by animals. Even in man this acting in view of objects still enters largely into the perception of them. Perception is, therefore, an attitude toward objects. Beginning, as perception does, in instinctive performance, percepts must be regarded as more or less refined emotions.

History of Philosophy and Introduction to Philosophy in the College Curriculum. Discussion opened by Pres. JOHN H. MACCRACKEN.

In teaching philosophy to the average college student, we have three ends in view: first, discipline and development of the mental powers; second, to give that knowledge which in the words of Windelband is a necessary requirement not only for all scholarly education but for all culture whatever, since it teaches how the conceptions and forms have been coined in which we all in everyday life think and judge the world of our experience; and third, to lead the student to philosophize, to raise the ultimate questions, and thus to enter upon the noblest activity of his manhood. The first aim is accomplished more or less successfully in the courses on logic, psychology, and ethics, and the second by the courses on the history of philosophy. But the third aim is in danger of not receiving sufficient attention. Metaphysics has been crowded out of psychology and ethics. The modern tendency is to treat these subjects as sciences, and the student no longer finds here an introduction to philosophy proper. The appearance of courses and text-books on introduction to philosophy indicate a recognition of the want, and an attempt to supply it. Is a course of introduction the best solution? Three doubts suggest themselves. First, if we are seeking to furnish an encyclopædia of philosophy we run the risk of disgusting the student with philosophy because serving it up in its driest possible form. There is as much difference between such a bare outline of philosophical problems, and the works of a philosopher like Descartes or Locke, as between a brief history of the world and a good historical novel. Second, there is danger of developing

the superficial type of mind, which is already too common, which knows books by the book-reviews, and reads the news by the headlines, which may be said to know about rather than to know. Third, introductions to philosophy are rather philosophies of philosophy than philosophy. It is futile for an author to claim absolute impartiality. Better acknowledge with Paulsen that before finishing we must exhibit our system. Would not perhaps a careful study of some one author be preferable? Thus Jonathan Edwards began by reading Locke's *Essay*. Professor Sigwart of Tübingen gives to beginners the advice: "Read Hume, read Hume, read Hume."

Professor Caldwell, of Northwestern University, pointed out that the Scotch universities gave that very training in metaphysics which was lacking in the American curriculum. Professor Rebec described the course in the introduction to philosophy, as given at the University of Michigan; and Professor Royce described the course in philosophy as given at Harvard, and said that it was still regarded as tentative. He expressed doubt as to whether a study of a single system or of some one philosophic masterpiece would be very profitable for the average student. The history of philosophy should be treated as a part of the history of culture.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

An Introduction to Psychology. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1901.—pp. xv, 509.

This is a decidedly good book. And to make this statement about any text-book of psychology that ventures to enter the field of competition at the present time is already to give it high praise. The qualities that constitute this excellence are numerous. What immediately strikes one in a first rapid examination of the book is, perhaps, that it contains within its covers much that certain popular text-books see fit to omit. For example, one finds in the body of the text good cuts of eye and ear accompanied by brief descriptions, and in the Appendix a first-rate account of the brain, together with cuts illustrating its development, anatomy, and localization of function. Then, too, any one giving a first course in psychology wishes to say a word at least about such topics as comparative psychology, child psychology, social psychology, and some of the more instructive features of abnormal psychology. And it is certainly desirable to have these presented in concise form within easy reach of the student. One should wish too, it seems to the present writer, that the impression be left on the student's mind that such topics as the above are not mere side issues from which illustrative material may be drawn, but that they are legimate domains of inquiry within the larger field. At the same time, their distinctive difference of method, the more or less complete desertion of the way of introspection, should be kept clear. Now all this the author has very successfully accomplished by according separate chapters to these matters, where they are presented in brief but systematic form, with the main lines of difference between them and the matters treated in the body of the book kept constantly before the reader. Then, most novel and gratifying of all, there is a chapter on the "History of Psychological Systems" which gives a compact but illuminating outline of just those great movements of thought that the elementary student should know. An Appendix is added which is really a condensed book of reference. Here, besides the pages referred to above on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain, are to be found sections on Aphasia, on Color Theories, on Theories of the Attention, etc. There is also a short contribution by Miss Gamble on "The Physical and the Physiological Conditions of the Sensations of Smell." Thus, without seriously increasing the bulk of the volume, many subjects are

succinctly treated for which the instructor is frequently forced to refer students to special books—a method that turns out most unsatisfactorily where large classes are concerned.

But the inclusion of so much necessarily involves the exclusion of much else that many would regard as indispensable. There is, for instance, no treatment of the theoretical problem of psychical measurement. The phenomena of after-images and visual contrasts are mentioned in the Appendix only. For reaction experiments one is referred to the Bibliography. And one searches in vain for any chapters on sections which deal with the facts usually included under the heads of The Perception of Space and The Perception of Time. That a stereoscope has psychological value, or that there are such phenomena as geometrical optical illusions, are not to be known from a reading of the book. Now while these and other omissions are, seemingly, to be greatly regretted, they all have their reason apparently in the purpose of the author to consistently disregard the explicit description of experimental methods and results. This does not mean that she herself is not keenly alive to these matters. On the contrary, every discussion implies the constant reliance upon and expectation of the experimental test. Only for the ends of this book it is rather the discussion of the theoretical question, or the result of introspection unaided by experimentation, that is important. Thus the question of sensation-extensities is of greater moment than that of the visual factors in the perception of solidity, and the discussion of how a past experience may be recognized is given the right of way over the statement of results gained by an experimental examination of the time-consciousness. This apparent neglect of experimental data is made good in part by constant footnote references to the manuals of Sanford and Titchener, and by an excellent Bibliography at the end of the volume.

Upon examining the book somewhat more carefully, a second quality appears, which, in the opinion of the present writer, should belong to every book of this sort. This quality is gained by the persistent refusal to be rigidly dogmatic or to remain insensible to rival claims and theories. At almost every step the reader is allowed to take a brief view of the chief divergent opinions. Thus he gets a glimpse, at least, of the actual psychological world with all its wealth of discussion and critical probing. This method is in conspicuous contrast to that of a certain rather popular text-book, in the Preface to which its author distinctly affirms his conviction "that the main thing in teaching elementary psychology is to give one's pupils a system,"

whether right or wrong mattering little, since errors can be corrected. This conviction seems to rest partly upon the erroneous belief that any other treatment results in giving the student "a mere medley of conflicting opinion, a hodge-podge of psychological analysis, logical classification, and epistemological interpretation." Now, of course, a text-book is not primarily the place for controversial writing, but that there is a middle course between dreary dogmatism and polemical side-excursion is sufficiently proved by the book before us. Here the untried reader may catch sight of many divergent, and, for the moment, perhaps equally attractive paths. But he runs little risk of straying, for he is carefully advised by the author of the road which she herself, at least, prefers to follow. This course is no less deliberate than in the case of the text-book mentioned above. Only here the controlling conviction is that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp."

With this feature of the book the present writer is in hearty sympathy. Writers of text-books too often seem to presume that their books are to be read apart from the comments of a properly qualified instructor—as if the reader were to be left helpless in the midst of the materials offered him. But the presence of an instructor is as much to be reckoned with as that of the pupil, and when the former, to preserve his mental integrity, finds himself compelled again and again to make vigorous protests against some of the unqualified statements of the text, there is likely to be bred in the pupil's mind a growing distrust of an author who can write so dogmatically upon topics so obviously debatable. Such topics would be the Hering color theory, or the existence of an auditory space, or the number of the affective qualities. Distrust in a text-book is ruinous to a pupil, but the instructor can more readily change his text-book than surrender his convictions. The volume before us allows for divergence of opinion, but through clear statements of existing differences the reader is conducted to definite solutions.

It is perhaps largely due to this second feature of which we have been speaking that the book is pervaded by a strong personal note. This I should mention as a third quality which a relatively superficial examination reveals. The reader is admitted very largely into the confidence of the writer. Not that this is forced upon him. Quite the contrary. This admission to confidence lies rather in the genial, individual atmosphere surrounding the book—that atmosphere which Locke knew so well how to create, and for which James stands unsurpassed. Indeed, I know of no book which so successfully competes with the latter in this regard. Whether this is due to the heavy and

cheerfully acknowledged debt that she owes to James makes little difference. The atmosphere is there. Not only is one permitted a glimpse at the various opinions and the definite writers who have helped most towards the formation of her own private views, but one is sure to share more or less in the author's past experiences and travels. Now one is in Trafalgar Square in search of an illustration, now one makes a momentary visit to Italy. Or in imagination one is accompanying the author along the streets of Boston, or sharing with her the scenes of Gloucester harbor. Or it may be a character in a modern novel, or a bit of classic verse. It is all the same. The reader is not passing through the dreary desert of mere enumeration and classification. He is becoming acquainted with living mental processes in a richly personal way.

But the really significant features of the book lie much deeper. Stated in a word, they consist, first, in the thoroughgoing application of the author's doctrine of conscious elements, and, second, in the treatment of all concrete conscious experiences from two distinctly separated points of view—regarding them now as facts of consciousness analyzable into constituent elements, now as conscious experiences whose peculiarities result from the relations of the experiencing self to some other self or selves. Let us glance at each of these features separately.

(*a*) Readers acquainted with the author's articles on the elements of consciousness,[1] will foresee what application a systematic text-book must make of the results there reached. Not the sensation with its attributes of quality, intensity, and extensity, but these attributes themselves are the ultimate elements. Thus 'brightness' and 'loudness' are as truly elemental for the author as 'blue' or 'C.' 'Duration' is not admitted as an elementry state, because it is either "reflectively 'added' to the sensation, or else it is a complex psychic content."[2] In the book itself the present writer is unable to find any discussion or statement of this point. Duration is ignored, and the time-consciousness is recognized only in so far as it comes into relation with the "feeling of familiarity" and the "feeling of anticipatoriness," which are respectively the characterizing features of recognition and volition.

So much for the 'sensational' elements. Next come the 'attributive' elements, which include, besides the usually admitted processes of pleasantness and unpleasantness, a further element resembling

[1] *Psych. Rev.*, VI, p. 506, and VII, p. 377.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 511.

these, the "feeling of realness." This latter, the author claims, is a true elemental state, to be classed with the affective processes because like them it is dependent upon other processes in consciousness, and, also like them, is not invariably present.

But the most radical departure from orthodox procedure is to be found in the enumeration and systematic application of "relational" elements. Though the fact that these are denied by many writers is clearly enough recognized, there is no hesitation in accepting them here as genuine realities with which one may operate in the explanation of mental complexes. In accepting these elements as constituents of conscious life, the author leans heavily upon James's doctrine of "transitive" states, but like Meinong and others makes use of a broader term. In agreement with Meinong, too, she holds that the failure to accord recognition to these states is due in large part to their introspective elusiveness. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of these elements, it is suggested that the feelings of 'one' and of 'many,' of 'connection' and of 'opposition,' of 'more' and of 'less,' of 'like' and of 'different,' are certainly elemental, while the feeling of 'familiarity' analyzes into the simpler feeling of 'same' and of 'past,' the latter in turn being still further analyzable. It is these relational elements that allow the introduction of ready distinctions among complex processes. Thus a percept is escorted by the vague "feeling of combination"; comparison by the "feelings of likeness and difference"; while the general notion and the judgment are defined as primarily percepts or images supplemented by a "feeling of generality," itself a compound of the feelings of "likeness" and of "wholeness." These illustrations will serve to exhibit the author's general method of exposition in this particular. In the opinion of the present writer, this use of relational elements has the advantage not only of great clearness of exposition, but, what is more important, of being true to little recognized conscious realities. That the usual analysis of all consciousness into sensational and affective states is unsatisfactory seems to be attested by the attempt in certain quarters to find a multiplicity of affective states, by the attempt elsewhere to establish the reality of "form qualities," and by the unexpressed craving on the part of many for some way, more convincing than the ordinary one, of accurately characterizing such states as the "concept-consciousness" and the "recognition-consciousness." To be the first to operate systematically with these elements is to do a service for which all psychologists should be deeply grateful.

(*b*) The second significant feature mentioned above is due to the fulfilment of one of the author's main purposes in writing this book. And what gives the book in large part its distinctive quality is just this double treatment of our consciousness, as, on the one hand, a dead organism to be reduced by dissection to its constituent elements, and, on the other, as a sum of living, pulsating experiences which have their sources in the relationships between conscious selves. To approach the mental life from either one of these points of view is no new thing. What is decidedly novel here is the demonstration that both modes of treatment may stand side by side without danger of being confounded, and with all the advantages of uniting the analytic treatment and all the training in introspection which this unquestionably affords, with that presentation which gives us back our actual experiences, not distorted by methodological artificialities but in richly interpreted form. This is one of the factors that will go a long may towards making this an acceptable text-book. As an illustration of the application of this twofold method we may note the contrast between "percept" and "perceiving." The former is, as it were, static, to be taken to pieces, coldly and impersonally. The latter is the living process whose mark of differentiation from imagination is that it may be shared with other perceivers. So we find everywhere such contrasts as "image" and "imagining," "thought" and "thinking," "volition" and "will," "belief" and "faith." In discussing the emotions, a neat classification is permitted by the fact that the relations between selves may here be divided into "the imperious or egoistic, and the sympathetic or adoptive." Thus, happiness may be entirely dependent upon the attitude of another, but at the same time be egregiously selfish. Or, on the other hand, though no less dependent upon the attitude of another, the happiness may be entirely the result of a sympathetic sharing of experiences. All this is set forth in an entertainingly written chapter. This same distinction between the imperious and the adoptive attitudes forms the chief line of division between "will" and "faith."

A word should be said about the author's terminology in the exposition of these two significant features of the book just noticed. As will have been noted, the word "feeling" is used after the traditional English fashion adopted by James. Possibly the poverty of our psychological vocabulary compels this. But it is certainly to be regretted that the term "idea" is employed in the broad Lockian sense of any "fact of consciousness," of whatever elements—sensational, attributive, or relational—it may be composed. It certainly seems monstrous

to call an emotion an idea, but to such lengths is the author constrained by the attempt to briefly characterize the contrasting modes of treatment adopted,—"idea-psychology" and "self-psychology" being the terms of the antithesis. Of course, the author explains and partially defends this nomenclature, and in reading the book itself no confusion is felt. But it is none the less to be regretted that a more universally accepted term could not have been chosen.

It is obviously beyond the scope of this review to indicate in detail the points where one may most readily challenge the author's opinion. A few of these however may be noted. Not every one would admit that it is legitimate to regard attention "as a simple relational experience, that of clearness," in other words, that clearness is the "attention-element." And many would be far from assenting to the statement that "being interested and attending are one and the same thing." Many too, I fancy, would dissent vigorously from the identification of memory with fidelity of reproduction, regardless of the *recognition* of this reproduction as the recurrence of a past experience. But, for the author, "exactness of repetition" suffices to turn mere reproductive imagination into memory.

Obviously, one may dissent *in toto* from the doctrine of elements that pervades the entire volume, and one may be entirely out of sympathy with the dual point of view adopted. For such a one this is not the ideal text-book. But those who find here doctrines congenial to their own tendencies of thought will have no hesitation in recommending this book to an honest and cordial trial as a guiding text for classes in psychology. No perfect text-book of psychology has yet been written. And this as well as others has its peculiar faults, some of which have been briefly indicated. But, all in all, the present writer regards this as the best text-book that has yet appeared. Its subsequent use with his own classes will alter or confirm this opinion.

Naturally, the various chapters are of unequal merit. But to the writer those on "Thought," considered both independently and in comparison with similar chapters in other books, are perhaps the best in the volume. Certain pages of the chapter on the "Emotions" are most excellent, and the section on "The Religious Consciousness," as one of the typical personal relations, deserves high commendation. The exposition of the various color theories, both in the body of the text and in the Appendix, are the best that we yet have in compact form.

The typography of the book is excellent. Not a single typographical error has been noticed, though the name of the anthropologist,

Tylor, is persistently misspelled in the several places where it occurs.

A well chosen Bibliography and an index of unusual clearness close the volume.

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A Student's History of Philosophy. BY ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1901.—pp. ix, 519.

Considering the quantity and quality of the published products of the scholastic world, one is reminded of Johnson's characterization of a literary friend, as having an enormous appetite but a bad digestion. In the department of philosophy, taken in a broad sense, now and again a really good thing appears even from an esoteric point of view, but a large proportion of the output betrays an appetite that outstrips the powers of digestion and assimilation. Still it is to be remembered specific judgments differ, and it sometimes happens that the verdict of the grumbler is reversed in the court of public or academic opinion.

In *A Student's History of Philosophy*, Professor Rogers proposes to furnish what a student may fairly be expected to get from a college course; to emphasize the spirit in which each philosopher philosophized; to create certain broad general impressions, leaving further details to come from other sources; to use the writer's own words when literary interests supplement the philosophical; and to keep in mind the relation of individual systems to the general history of civilization by a mild use of the Hegelian philosophy of history. These prefatory avowals are supplemented by introductory remarks on the nature of the history of philosophy, and on primitive conceptions of the world. The latter point is insignificantly treated, but suggests the Hegelian historical moment, while the former lays down: "The History of Philosophy attempts to give an account of the more important and comprehensive of these conceptions," ("thing or substance, cause and effect, force, law, mechanism, necessity") "in terms of which we are accustomed to think of the world, and to trace the mental and social conditions out of which they took their rise. It is an account of the growth of man's power to formulate the universe." With this emphasis on concepts and man's power to formulate the universe, it is strange that we miss from the index any reference to force, energy, and mechanism. The author makes no effort to follow the Cartesian 'motion' through Spinoza into Leibniz. That Descartes postulated matter in motion, that Spinoza confessedly broke down in supposing it possible to deduce motion from extension, that

precisely here Leibniz covers both matter and motion by his 'force,' and introduced a concrete spiritualism without destroying the Spinozistic identity, is completely ignored. Indeed, 'motion' is not mentioned in the account of Spinoza, although motion and rest are the categories of all the modifications of extension. What is lacking in the statement of Spinoza's metaphysics has a compensation in an admirable exposition of his *Lebensanschauung*. The presentation of Leibniz is excellent and fairly complete. As regards the characterization of the mental condition out of which philosophy arises, a reference to Greek thought will suffice. "The Greek frankly moved in the realm of the finite where definition and order reigned, and he could know just what he was talking about. The infinite was to him the region of chaos, and stood on a distinctly lower plane of reality." Indeed, the author is not always happy in characterizing "mental and social conditions." He speaks of the Greeks as "originating the art types which have stood as models ever since," and accords to the Greeks a mental homogeneity that is in sharp contrast with the heterogeneity of their philosophical systems. The dogmatic and uncritical procedure is annoying at many points throughout the work, as when we are told without further ado that the *Nous* of Anaxagoras is a material principle, and that the *homo-mensura* tenet of Protagoras is individualistic. All this may be true, but recent discussion suggests other interpretations, especially of the Protagorean principle. (See Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I., pp. 451 and 589.) In "creating certain broad general impressions" in regard to individual philosophers; in making apt quotations illustrating the spirit in which they philosophized; and in writing a literary appreciation of the history of philosophy Professor Rogers has been in the main successful. His style is on the whole excellent, and at points his exposition is luminous, but the general impressions are not always correct, and the copious quotations are too rarely located by references. Bacon and Descartes, who come in for extensive excerpts, are left in a somewhat ragged condition. It would have been a positive aid to the student had a comparison and contrast of methods been made at this point, perhaps after the manner of Windelband.

However widely detailed opinions may differ as to what a history of philosophy should be, we may presuppose essential agreement on the proposition that it should put first emphasis on problems of being, of knowing, and of method; that it should treat these problems to some extent in the light of present day interests and values, thus giving an historical exposition of contemporary thought. This point

of view would imply that the history of philosophy should come late in the college course, and should presuppose some preliminary work. Such an arrangement would render Professor Rogers's elementary and uncritical work less desirable than if it were proposed to begin the study of philosophy by a survey of its history, which seems to be a bad plan save where the teacher leads the way by lectures. Supposing the student's interest in the history of philosophy to arise mainly from his interest in current drifts and problems, the first requisite in writing a history of philosophy is a thorough knowledge and an accurate judgment regarding present conditions. This part of the task Professor Rogers performed not very comprehensively in his *Modern Philosophy* (1899). In both works (see especially *Modern Philosophy*, p. 281 and p. 512 of the present volume) we are impressed with a hopeless dogmatic dualism like that of Descartes; but unlike Descartes he does not foreshadow a possible solution save through an abundance of accumulated data. Again, Professor Rogers does not appear to be *en rapport* with the fundamental concepts which form the content of philosophy. Here the stone of stumbling is his erroneous conception of empirical law as something objectively real. Thus he speaks of "laws of rigid mechanical necessity," p. 512; of laws as "instruments," p. 3; of "purely objective laws," p. 465. Such terms as these, accepted without criticism and used dogmatically, render philosophical discussion impossible or at least misleading. It is not surprising that there are those who wish to abolish the term "law" from the vocabulary of science and philosophy. The almost complete absence of attention to the critical analysis of concepts and doctrines is perhaps the weightiest charge against the author's work.

If we keep in mind the demands of the student upon a history of philosophy, there are several features in which the present treatise is disappointing. Naturalistic views are not as concretely represented as they should be in Democritus and Hobbes, considering the influence of these philosophers upon their successors. No mention is made of the theory of evolution in connection with the Ionic school and Heraclitus, although the central idea in both is "becoming," and the explanation of the process involves the cardinal principles of an evolutional philosophy that not only powerfully influenced the thought of Greece, but anticipated both Hegel and Darwin. When the theory is taken up in modern philosophy, it is disposed of along with Darwin and Spencer in three and one-half pages. We are told that, "in its general outlines it is now familiar to every one." Then we are straightway informed that it "is a fact" that acquired characteristics

are transmitted to the offspring,—just as if the views of Galton and Weismann were ruled out. Again it is said, "the fact of evolution is definitely established." What is the fact of evolution that is definitely established? Or perhaps evolution is regarded as a "fact." If so, this is something new. The reference to teleology is unsatisfactory, and no adequate distinction is made between the teleology that evolution combats, and the teleology that it favors. The theory of evolution is a system of generalizations of such importance, and we may add of such vagueness, as to require careful exposition. In close connection with this defect, is the inadequate representation of the voluntaristic drift in the history of philosophy, especially in Aristotle, Augustine, and Fichte. Schelling is disposed of in a page without any reference to his dynamism or energism. He certainly should not be classed with Spinoza (p. 455), unless we agree with Berendt and Friedlaender that according to Spinoza the essence of things lies in the will. (See Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 514.) Malebranche gets a mere mention of name. It is difficult to understand why he is so much overlooked by historians of philosophy. One who engaged the attention of Locke and powerfully influenced Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant; one who saw clearly the priority of will, and grasped the conservation of force, *la quantitié de la force mouvante*, and clearly anticipated Hume in his critique of the causal relation, deserves more than passing reference. The language of Malebranche is that of a priest, but his thought is that of a modern scientist and philosopher. Professor Rogers is quite aware of the significance of the problem as to whether reality lies in will or intellect, but he has not appreciated its historical prominence. Two other aspects of the history of philosophy should have been led into modern thought with more clearness. The one is the issue as to the nature of general notions, especially the middle position taken by Artistotle and Abelard. The other is the rise and the vicissitudes of the theory of the "twofold truth" which haunts and confuses much of the thinking of the present. If the history of philosophy is to be of real value to the student of philosophy, it must keep a clear eye on the evolution of such theories and issues.

There are some omissions that might appear to be unpardonable in a work intended for the English-speaking student. Why should the Scottish philosophy, which for about three quarters of a century constituted the philosophic pabulum in the American college, be dismissed in half a page? Even if one deplored its life, some reference should have been made to its obsequies. The last section of the work cover-

ing twenty-eight pages has the familiar heading, "Philosophy Since Hegel," more than half of which is given to Schopenhauer and Comte. The thought of Mill and Spencer is practically ignored, while no reference is made to either Lotze or Green. It is a long time "since Hegel," measured in years, and a much longer time, gauged by what has taken place in scientific and philosophic thought. There is little excuse for abandoning the American student in a German fog of sixty years ago. The literature appended to each paragraph is confined to English works, and is generally well selected. Some good works are omitted, such as Fowler's edition of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, and Lévy-Bruhl's *History of Modern Philosophy in France*. Watson's *Comte, Mill, and Spencer*, and *Outline of Philosophy* are noted as though they were two distinct treatises, whereas the latter is a revised and enlarged edition of the former. The omission of the principal works of the philosopher under consideration is a defect, as the student is greatly assisted by knowing under what titles and at what times the thinker elaborated his views. There is certainly room for an up-to-date monograph on the history of philosophy, considered as a theory which embraces the problems of being, of knowing, and of method, and at the same time one that is critically selective in its material, but there is no place in a modern college or university with a specialized department of philosophy for an uncritical rehearsal of what has been gone over repeatedly during the last fifty years. The work is not strong in systematic exposition save in a few instances; it is decidedly weak as regards insight into the historical development of philosophy. Its perusal suggests a pedagogical remark of Theodore Parker: "The books which help you most are those which make you think the most. The hardest way of learning is by easy reading." If Parker's view is incorrect, some of the criticisms passed upon this work are to be considerably modified.

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Religionsphilosophie. Von HARALD HÖFFDING, unter mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. BENDIXEN. Leipzig, O. R. Reisland, 1901.—pp. vi, 369.

Professor Höffding has now added to his well-known works on Psychology, Ethics, and the History of Philosophy a work on the Philosophy of Religion. From no one of the eminent continental thinkers of the day could such a work be more welcome. The special task of the philosophy of religion as Höffding conceives it, is to determine the relation of religion to the spiritual life as a whole of which it is a

part. In the classical times of religion, the periods of formation and organization, no such problem could arise. Religion then satisfied all spiritual demands. The other forms of the spiritual life, science, art, morality, and social life, were quite undifferentiated from, or at any rate unquestioningly subordinated to, the religious interest. Not till the development of culture gives these several activities of the spirit an independent standing of their own, is there any lack of harmony felt. Not till then, therefore, is there any call for a philosophy of religion. The time comes when religion must have its value estimated in relation to other phases and forms of the spiritual life. Every spiritual power must be tested by its service to the deep and rich development of the life of the spirit. The problem to-day is to investigate in what at measure religion can continue to perform such a service under the conditions of modern culture. To make a problem of religion is, to be sure, shocking to many. But thought once aroused must set its own limits. He who feels no problem has, of course, no reason to think; but such an one has, on the other hand, no reason to hinder others from thinking. The investigation is not intended either for the poor in spirit anxious for the security of their faith, or for the self-satisfied, whether of the orthodox or the free-thinking type.

After an introduction discussing problem and procedure (about a dozen pages), the work is divided into three main parts. The first part considers the relation of the religious to the scientific view of the world (*Erkenntnistheoretische Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 13–84). The principal problem of the second part is the determination of the essential nature of religion, and the possibility of its survival under modern conditions (*Psychologische Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 85–289). The third part discusses the relation of ethics and religion (*Ethische Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 290–347). Finally, there is an appendix containing some twenty pages of notes.

In its classical times, religion satisfied man's intellectual needs as well as his other spiritual interests. Now, we have an independent science to meet our intellectual demands. The sundering of faith and knowledge has been completed by the repeated collisions of science with religion. After much resistance from the religious side, it has come to be admitted that the scientific explanation of the world is not a matter for religion. "What now all theologians repeat, the Bible is not meant to teach natural science, no one would listen to when Bruno, Galilei and Spinoza said it. The heresy persecution takes its course, and afterwards, men come to see that what the heretic said was right" (p. 14). Every great religion came forward in history with a general

view of the world. In comparison with earlier religions, Christianity had a certain rational character in its explanation of the world, and especially a simplicity and sublimity which must have appealed most strongly to many men who had known only the earlier religions with their heterogeneous mythologies. Even now, we not infrequently have the two sorts of explanation—the scientific and the religious advanced for the same event. Höffding illustrates this by an incident that happened a few years ago. A number of fisherman perished in a sudden storm that arose. In the same issue of the local newspaper was given the scientific explanation of the meteorological institute, and the religious explanation of the funeral oration, which said that God had sent the calamity as a warning for the people to turn from their sins. These two views of the occurrence do not so much conflict with one another, as stand in totally different spheres of thought. The scientific interpretation is an explanation of reality; the religious interpretation, an estimate of values. When science postulates the complete connectedness of things, and thereby sets as its goal a principle of unity, it cannot find its ideal in a 'First Cause,' for this would violate the very principle of causation itself on which it seeks to ground itself. As the Kantian criticism excluded God from the causal series, so previously, Copernican and Cartesian views had excluded God from matter and space. There is no longer any higher and lower in space, to which can be referred the higher and lower spiritual values. Much the same difficulty meets us from the point of view of time. With the thought of time as infinite, there is no place for eternity outside of time. The religious consciousness has generally regarded one period of life as merely a means for another. Means and end are sundered, and life is divided between joyless labor and laborless enjoyment. Every advance in the art of education, in ethics, and in sociology, goes to eliminate this dualism (the worst of all dualisms) (p. 58). Just as no one man should be made a mere means for another, so in the life of the individual no one moment should be mere means for another—as past and present for the future. This is avoided if the work and the development itself possess an immediate worth, and thereby become ends or parts of an end. Thus it becomes possible in the midst of time to live in eternity. The externality of the time differences falls away. Eternity appears, not as a continuation of time or a further time, but as an expression for the continuity of the worthful amid the changes of time. The one possible solution of the difficulties, as regards causal, spatial, and temporal relations, lies in the direction of a more inward connection—the emphasis must be put on the inner law and the

worthful content, and not on external differences. The conclusion reached is happily forecasted by the motto at the head of this chapter, the line from Goethe: *Ihm ziemt's, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen.*

The ultimate presupposition for the scientific understanding of existence is the principle of unity, which underlies all connection in time, space, and the causal series. We can reach no ultimate ideas through such concepts as matter, atom, force. The only ultimate is the connection, the totality of elements, and through these we come to the principle of unity. As it is to be assumed that the understanding of existence must stand in connection with its own nature, we have the right to speak of a force or power by whose working all that is and all that happens stands in inner connection, and is held together by a relation of continuity. If one defines God as the principle of the understanding of being, and therefore as the principle of the unity of being, the possibility presents itself of a conception of God that may be harmoniously united with scientific knowledge. But all thought consists in comparing and connecting one thing with another; and, in the last analysis, this law makes an objective conclusion to our knowledge impossible. Each new determination of thought discloses a new problem. Our thinking reveals its nobility in this very fact that it can recognize its own limits, and yet at the limit always hear the cry, 'Excelsior!' "Every conception of God," says Fichte, "is a misconception of God." It is a revelation of a divine spark in human thought, that with all its efforts to understand the divine it can attain to the insight that these are misunderstandings.

Personal life is the highest form of existence which experience shows us. The unity which we must attribute to being, on account of its continuity and conformity to law, reminds us of the unity of our own consciousness, the formal side of personality. But this is only an analogy which fails in the essential point. Theistic philosophers, like Lotze and others, maintain that only an infinite being can possess personality, that only an absolutely active being can be a person in the fullest sense. This means, however, that the word personality is given a different significance when applied to God and when applied to man; and this is just the view of Spinoza and Kant, when they reach the conclusion that after separating all that which is valid only for a finite being from our idea of personality, only the mere word remains. The deity must be more than personality if it is to be the principle of unity in all being. Religions are not made, they grow up out of life, they spring from the fundamental disposition of man in the midst of life's conflicts, for the sake of holding fast under all circumstances the validity

of those things of highest worth which he has come to know by his experience. In this faith in the conservation of worth is to be found the essence of religion. This is the main thesis which Professor Höffding aims to establish by this work. The result of Part I is to clear the ground and dispel all illusion as to a possible intellectual function of religion. The riddle which science cannot solve is not to be solved by religion. It can give no explanation of special occurrences, its ideas are not suited to bring scientific thinking to an ultimate conclusion, and these ideas possess the character of the image rather than the concept. If religious ideas are to have any significance whatever, it can be only that they serve as a symbolic expression for the disposition and longings of man in the struggle of life. Incidentally, idealism, materialism, and agnosticism are subjected to criticism. In distinction from these, Professor Höffding denominates his own philosophical view of the world as critical monism. This outline paraphrase of Part I. will serve to show something of the spirit and trend of thought of the writer. It can show nothing of that wealth of scholarship and breadth of human sympathy that are everywhere manifest to the reader.

In part second (the psychological part) the direct effort is made to establish the hypothesis that the essence of religion is faith in the conservation of value (*der Glaube an die Erhaltung des Wertes*), or as otherwise expressed, that the distinctively religious axiom is the principle of the conservation of value. Religious experience and faith, and the main types of religion as they have appeared in history, are all subjected to a keen psychological analysis. After establishing his hypothesis by this analysis, the author then goes on to a more elaborate exposition of his principle, and finally seeks to show in what form religion may continue under the conditions of modern culture. Space forbids us to try to follow the discussion in detail; we may observe in passing, however, that it is carried out with all the psychological insight that one familiar with Höffding's *Psychology* would naturally expect. The knowledge manifested of the history of religion and of the lives and writings of eminent religious men is equally comprehensive. We shall try simply to find out just what our author means by "faith in the conservation of value." In the introduction, we are told that the expression "conservation of value" is used in close analogy with the expression "conservation of energy." The principle asserts the continual preservation of value throughout all changes of form. There is, too, potential value as well as actual value. Potential value is in one passage illustrated by the pause in music. The pause in itself has no value. To one just entering the room or to one leaving before the next

strain of music it would be nothing, and yet it may have the highest æsthetic value to the continuous listener. Value signifies the characteristic of a thing by which it furnishes immediate satisfaction or the means for such. Value may thus be immediate or mediate. The nature of a being determines its needs, and its needs determine what is value to it. The religious axiom shows, accordingly, the necessity that the character of a religion be determined by the nature and needs of its adherents. One cannot be in earnest with a belief in the persistence of value which he does not know, at least in part, from his own experience. The manifold forms of religion do not therefore invalidate the hypothesis that its fundamental principle is the conservation of value.

All feeling, *i. e.*, all pleasure and displeasure, expresses value. The various kinds of value correspond to the various kinds of feeling. One group of values goes along with self-assertion, from its most elemental to its most ideal forms—another group accompanies devotion to objects and ends beyond the conditions of immediate self interest. Here belong the ethical, æsthetic, and intellectual feelings. The possibility of a third group of values depends upon whether in existence, as it really is, the values of the first two groups can be secured and maintained. Were man only a player in the drama of existence, his part in the play would exhaust all his energy and interest. He would have no time, strength, or interest for the course of the drama as a whole. His values would all belong to the first group. Were he only a spectator his interest in the drama would be purely intellectual or æsthetic. His values would be those of the second group. If he is both actor and spectator then must he possess values of the third sort. With his innermost being, and for the sake of the highest values known to him, he will feel himself drawn into the great order and course of things. He will feel himself bound up with the fate of values in general. The religious feeling is this feeling determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence. It is a feeling determined by the relation of value to reality. In comparison with the first two groups of values, we may say that the religious values are values of a second order.

Such a view of the essence of religion, seems to me open to serious criticism. Is not the analogy between conservation of value and the conservation of energy somewhat too far fetched? And have we in the principle of the conservation of value anything distinctive of religion after all? We may admit Höffding's success in showing that all religions involve this element, but does not all intelligent effort in whatever sphere imply a faith in the continuance of values, and involve

some sort of conception of the relation between value and reality? Or, to put the question in another way, is there after all any third group of values—even if we are both actors and spectators in the drama of life, have we necessarily any interests beyond those included in the first two groups? At any rate, it seems to me that Professor Höffding fails to give us any sufficient proof of this. When he comes to discuss the question of the form and maintenance of religion under modern conditions, his conclusion is that legend and dogma must give way to symbol, and each individual must be left free to develop for himself such a faith in the persistence of values as best answers to his own needs. Matthew Arnold defined religion as morality touched with emotion, but have we on Professor Höffding's theory any basis for the emotion? And even if there be some ground of emotion for the individual in his self-chosen poetic symbolism, anything of the nature of a social dynamic seems to be entirely wanting. Furthermore, if religion is to be of any value, it must set a standard of values. The faith of the Hebrew in a God of Righteousness, for example, gave him a standard by which he judged his moral values to be of infinitely greater worth than those of any other kind. A vague sort of belief that our values are somehow to be elements in a coming kingdom of values affords us no standard of judgment. The practical question for us is, which of the various kinds of value possible to us shall we seek most to realize? It is difficult to see how a belief in the conservation of values in general can help us any.

Though the reader may not admit that Professor Höffding has established his central hypothesis, though he may feel that religion must after all be something either considerably more or considerably less than here indicated, he will find the work one that well repays careful study. It is not the final word on the problem of religion, but it is a notable and worthy contribution to what is perhaps the weightiest problem that the human intellect has set for itself.

This work ought to be translated into English; and we may add that an analytical table of contents and an index would materially aid in its comprehension, and add to its usefulness.

F. C. FRENCH.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

La base psychologique des jugements logique. I et II. H. HÖFFDING. Rev. Ph., XXVI, 10 et 11, pp. 345–378; 501–539.

(I) Intuition is the first form of the equilibrium and harmony of consciousness. In passing over to judgment, it is necessary first to resolve the totality of intuition, *i. e.*, to analyze. In order to examine the transition from intuition to judgment, one must distinguish between the three principal forms of intuition: (1) intuition of sensation, (2) of perception, (3) of memory and imagination. Intuition of sensation involves a combination of more elementary sensations, but not necessarily a fusion. In the intuition of perception, memory is already an important factor; the new is identified with the previous experience which it most resembles. The intuition of memory and imagination is distinguished from the other two forms by the greater clearness with which the processes giving rise to intuition come out in consciousness. What makes the matter more complicated, is the fact that motives of feeling are operative here more than elsewhere. In all this, we are confronted with an antinomy. The most characteristic trait of mental life is synthetic activity; but the synthesis presupposes something that can be put together, and no simple elements appear in consciousness. We find ourselves going in a circle—a sign that we are before one of the limits of our understanding. Not all 'potential judgments' can be transformed into real judgments. Several authors regard (what would better be called) 'intuition of articulation' as a form of judgment; but such implicit judgments differ from judgments proper, which involve analysis.

(II) Association is to the dynamic what intuition is to the static aspect of mental life. Spontaneity belongs to both. Association and intuition are distinguished from judgment in a similar way; the attention is not directed to the relation between the elements that are combined. Judgment intervenes the moment this relation attracts attention. Interest and attention are operative in every case of association. Association is mainly

productive, while judgment is critical; but this contrast is not absolute. There is a continuous reciprocal action between the two.

(III) Judgment, in the strict sense, is the higher form of the solution of the problem which, in a more elementary form, is resolved by intuition or by association. Analysis is essential here. The essence of judgment is the new combination rendered more clear by the preceding analysis; but not every analysis leads to a judgment. In analysis, differences appear more clearly than before; but, on the other hand, a resemblance and a continuity more fundamental than that in intuition and association may also appear. There is always a tendency in abstract thought to maintain a certain number of categories, but history shows that these tend to change as a result of further experience.

(IV) Positive judgments apparently precede negative judgments. A negative judgment does not afford a new content; its important function is precisely to reject such a new content. At the same time, its value consists in preparing the way for further positive judgments. In provisional classifications, we must often rest content with defining a certain domain in merely negative terms. It is the task of further research to discover the characteristic positive traits of the enclosed domain.

(V) Propositions without subjects may be divided into two classes: (1) those where the subject has already been named or is understood more or less clearly from the context; (2) those which are purely descriptive, *i. e.*, where one describes a phenomenon without its being grammatically possible to indicate a definite subject,—*e. g.*, 'it is cold.' It is always to be noted that the logical predicate is the most important element of judgment. As Trendelenburg says: We think in predicates. One might almost venture the hypothesis that all words are at first predicates, and that it is only later that they appear as grammatical subjects; but perhaps careful investigation would not confirm this hypothesis. The subject is the hinge upon which the gate turns; it is the gate and its movement that strike the eye, not the hinge. Predicative judgments, at any rate, are not a mere combination of conceptions. Passing to judgments where both subject and predicate are expressed, we find that the prominence of the subject may vary considerably, while the predicate always remains the more prominent element. (H. gives several classes of examples which go to prove this.) Judgment is formed by a voluntary or involuntary comparison. As soon as this comparison presents itself as a formal task, we may speak of reasoning proper. Comparison presupposes a bringing together. The synthetic process involved is the same that we meet with throughout the conscious life. One may very well continue to define judgment as a combination of conceptions, but it is necessary to remember that conceptions themselves are completely determined only when they are combined so as to form a judgment. Moreover, each new judgment contributes to the formation of further conceptions. This may look like moving in a circle, but such is the enigma of the origin of

both organic and conscious life: neither in the one nor in the other can the totality exist without parts, and neither in the one nor in the other can the totality be explained as the result of a mere combination of parts.

(VI) Intuitions, associations, and judgments appear at first with an existential quality which can become the object of consciousness only if a contrary quality (non-existence) is met with in experience, which will take place as soon as one recognizes the fact that experience affords negative as well as positive cases. One gradually comes to recognize the necessity of the reciprocal harmony of all that can exist, and thus to employ a formal criterion of reality. The world of experience is constantly growing, and is never completed. Moreover, the conception of reality or existence is an ideal conception, strange as it may seem; and this also develops with our increasing knowledge of the world order. Appreciative judgments are somewhat analagous to those of existence; by means of them one creates an ideal world, the dominant law of which is determined by the appreciative principle. Thus moral and religious problems are intimately connected with those of science. E. A.

Les dogmatismes sociaux et la libération de l'individu. S. PALANTE. Rev. Ph., XXVI, 12, pp. 626–647.

The purpose of the author is to expose the inanity of every social dogma, which exposure he regards as the indispensable propædeutic for the liberation of the individual. Social dogmatisms are classified as dogmatisms *a priori*, and dogmatisms *a posteriori*. Of the first class, there are distinguished two types: the transcendent rationalism, and the rationalism of immanence. Plato and Kant are representatives of the transcendent rationalism, and Hegel of immanence. The dogmatisms *a posteriori* are expressed by the term, solidarity. There are several forms of solidarity, such as generic or organic solidarity, economic solidarity, intellectual solidarity, and moral and social solidarity. All of these forms have been invoked as the basis of social dogmatisms. After reviewing these different kinds of solidarity, the author concludes "that it is impossible to erect in dogma, the collective egoism." He also adds that "these collective egoisms remain armed against one another, and the law of the struggle for existence, in spite of optimistic affirmations, displays here, implacably, its effects. H. C. STEVENS.

The World as Mechanism. G. S. FULLERTON. Psych. Rev., IX, 1, pp. 1–26.

Science is coming more and more to the view that the changes which take place in the world of matter form an unbroken series and are all explicable according to mechanical laws. As yet, however, there are many phenomena of which no mechanical explanation can be given. But to admit our present ignorance is not to maintain that it is, in the nature of

things, ultimate and irremovable. The steady growth of science encourages a hope that discontinuity will give place to continuity. This faith in the mechanism of nature can be justified only by an actual extension of knowledge, and until then, the doctrine can be no more than a working hypothesis. The purpose of this paper is to examine the considerations brought forward to prove that mechanism should not be held even as a working hypothesis. (1) Dr. Ward's attempt to prove that the science of mechanics is no true science, and that its fundamental concepts are absurd and self-contradictory, arises out of a misconception of the nature of the science, and of the foundation upon which it rests. This misconception is to suppose that a true science can have no limitations, and that it must be complete before it can have a foundation. We may well admit that all our measurements are only approximate, and that certain scientific concepts, useful within a given sphere, are inadequate when carried beyond the confines of our knowledge. But this is not to say that mechanics is not a true science, or that it does not rest upon a reasonably secure foundation. It remains true that we can, *e. g.*, calculate with some degree of accuracy the position of the moon with reference to the earth on a particular day and hour, and we can trace with some accuracy the path of a projectile. If, in the light of new discoveries, some scientific laws have to be modified, it means only that a truth imperfectly apprehended has come to be more perfectly apprehended. A growth in human knowledge is not revolution. (2) Certain writers have denied the existence of material causes, because they confound the notions of causality and activity, or erroneously assume that a cause can only be something occult and mysterious. The relation between cause and effect is not that of activity and passivity, but at the same time it is more than that of *mere* antecedence and succession. The cause is the 'necessary' and 'indespensable' antecedent, and such antecedents science is able definitely to pick out, overlooking, for its purposes, the negligible influences of other antecedents. (3) Some writers repudiate natural necessity, simply because they fail to see that the word 'necessity' is an ambiguous one. Necessity is but another name for orderliness, and to deny this necessity is to deny all possibility of knowledge. Again, it has been maintained that science should not attempt 'explanation,' but confine itself to 'description.' But it is only by giving the word 'explanation' an unjustifiable meaning that we can insist that science is unable to offer any explanation of occurrences in the material world. (4) Many who feel that mechanical causes are sufficient to bring about all the changes in the inorganic world, yet cannot believe that the conception of mechanism is adequate when we pass to the organic world. The phenomena of plant and animal life seem too complex to admit of description in mechanical terms; and such a thing as choice of ends is absolutely wanting in even the most ingenious mechanisms. Between mechanisms and the higher forms of living beings the difference is admittedly enormous. But between the two there are forms of life that bring us near to the point where the gulf between the organic and the

inorganic seems passable. Those who hold that all motions in matter cannot be accounted for on mechanical grounds, are not agreed as to where the line should be drawn, and modern science is strongly inclined to remove all breaks in the orderly development of nature.

M. S. MACDONALD.

Choice and Nature. EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. Mind, No. 41, pp. 72–91.

The individual finds himself confronted with a group of facts. Every judgment capable of either truth or error must involve a question of fact. That is not to say that every judgment reduces to a question of fact; for in so far as these facts have enough meaning to be pointed out as facts they show the traces of description with all that this implies of past choices of classification. At any stage of our growing knowledge, if we try to tell what nature is, we are presented with a choice of alternative classifications; and as no stage can be found which does not embody past choices, it would seem that this series of choices is involved in anything we do or can mean by nature. At no stage are we presented with a situation so purely factual that it cannot be altered by a re-interpretation. Observation has an important place in our lives; but our experience is not increased by bare additions. The real value of observation is to serve as the stimulus to new interpretations. These interpretations are indeterminate save for a principle of choice not given by the facts themselves. This choice is not the individual's own, nor is it the choice of the society of his own time, for that is only a larger individual; but it is the choice of universal society. To contradict the will of this universal society would be the destruction of the meaning of experience. Such a will dictates a principle of choice that gratifies a desire which an individual may well possess. In so far as an individual desires what all must desire if they would have experience, nature as embodying our interpretations must yield him satisfaction. But in so far as the desire is purely individual, nature offers no guarantee that it shall be granted. As the type of universal desire we have taken maximum simplicity, economy, or unity. It may be that the concepts of goodness and beauty are involved in this principle.

G. W. T. WHITNEY.

Le phénoménisme et l'ancienne métaphysique. D. MERCIER. Rev. Néo-Scolastique, VIII, 4, pp. 321–337.

Many modern philosophers consider the ancient distinction between substance and accident superfluous; there are, they say, exterior phenomena and internal occurrences; between these there are relations of succession and reciprocal action, and neither exterior observation nor consciousness show us anything else. 'Substance' is a thing unknowable, and therefore of no importance.—The dispute centers about two points: (1) Has the intelligence ideas upon the specific nature of beings, the objective reality of which it can guarantee? (2) Does immediate experience give us a sub-

stance and accidents, and, if so, what is the reality of the first as distinct from that of the second? It may be answered that we have an immediate, although confused, knowledge of substance in the first immediate notion of *something existing in itself*. What we perceive through experience is a being existing in itself, or a being existing in another being. The existence of accidents presupposes a substance.—It may be admitted that the substance-soul is not *adequately* distinct from its acts; but that it is not *partially* distinct must be denied. We never see accidents without substance, nor substance without accidents, and natural reason is incompetent to establish, within the created world, their adequate distinction. Only Catholic theology teaches us that there are—in the Holy Eucharist—accidents without substance.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative? B. RUSSELL. Mind, No. 39, pp. 293–317.

This paper contains: (1) A statement of the absolute and relative theories of time and space; (2) a proof that in the case of time it is difficult, if not impossible, to free the relational theory from contradiction; (3) a proof that in the case of space, the relational theory must be so modified, if it is to be logically permissible, as to lose all the advantages which it claims over the absolute theory; and (4) a refutation of the arguments against absolute space. The absolute theory of time assumes two classes of entities: those which *are* positions, and those which *have* positions. By compounding a term which has position with a position which it has we obtain a complex term —the term *at* the position. Three simple relations are found: before, after, and at. The relational theory requires but a single class of entities, any two of which may have one and only one of three unanalyzable relations: priority, posteriority, and simultaneity. But no entities answering to this definition can be found. And if the advocate of this theory abandons the search for events with a unique temporal position, and confines himself to qualities (*i. e.*, to terms which have position in time), he finds it impossible to obtain a time-series at all. It becomes necessary to hold that qualities as such have temporal relations. So that if one quality be found to precede another, we must hold that the former as such precedes the latter as such. But the former may also be found to succeed, or to be simultaneous with the latter. This breaks down the whole time-series, which depends upon the mutual incompatibility of its constituent relations. —In the case of space, the relational theory, if it confines itself to actual material points, between which spatial relations exist, is unable to give an account, consistent with the facts, of the intersection of geometrical figures, the order of lines and planes, and the nature of areas and volumes. If it invokes other material points, not assumed to exist, but regarded as entities related to time and to existent material points, as these are related to time and to each other, it becomes logically admissible, but loses whatever ad-

vantage it may possess over the absolute theory. Lotze's arguments against absolute space are answered at length. Lotze's theory of relations implies that all propositions consist in the ascription of a predicate to a subject, and that this ascription is not a relation. The objection is, that the predicate is either something or nothing. If nothing, it cannot be predicated, and the pretended proposition collapses. If something, predication expresses a relation, and a relation of the very kind which the theory was designed to avoid. Thus in either case, the theory stands condemned.

J. W. BAIRD.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

On Active Attention. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, No. 41, pp. 1–31.

Active attention is defined by the author, "as such theoretic or perceptive occupancy of myself, by an object, as is due to and involved in a volition of some sort, directed on that object." From this, it appears that active attention, on one side, partakes of the nature of thought, and, on the other, of the nature of will. Both thought and will may exist independent of active attention. But active attention implies the essence of both, in that it is occupied by an 'object' which is ideal, and in that it attempts the realization of that 'object.' By 'object' of attention is meant, not a single perception or idea, but the "set of interest" in which a single detail finds itself.

H. C. STEVENS.

The Dynamics of Attention. G. SPILLER. Mind, No. 40, pp. 498–524.

"Attention is identical with cerebral changes. It means neural functioning or the expenditure of that portion of the fund of bodily energy which is devoted to neural functioning." In considering attention we consider the play of neural changes from the point of view of their direction, degree, and volume. This paper then claims to deal with a certain aspect of cerebral change—with the reasons why such changes tend now in this direction, now in that. These reasons are summarized as sixteen factors which induce changes in the field of attention. Among them are: fatigue, competition of a strong sensation, attainment by attention of its end, anxiety, hunger, etc., persistent memory of a tune or a word, call to duty, etc., etc. Attention is the *sine qua non* of the existence for us of everything intelligible. Our whole world—outer and inner alike—is essentially dependent upon it; sensations, images, and feelings, owe their existence to it. No process of organic functioning, no act, however habitual, occurs without it. Attention in the normal waking state is quantitatively alike in all men at all times. This quantum may be concentrated upon a small area, or diffused over a broad field—though the latter case is rather a rapid succession of flights from part to part. The direction of attention never rests, but is in constant change. We undoubtedly can attend to more than one object at a time. Indeed, it is impossible to attend to a single object. Attention deals, not

with points, but with fields; it has no focus. Among the conditions favorable to attention, the author enumerates: the presence of an irresistible inclination to attend; good health, because ill-health decreases the amount of energy available for functioning; interest in, and previous acquaintance with, the object of attention; ability to dismiss the previous object of attentention and to attend whole-heartedly to the new object. Willing is distinguished from attention in that "attention *always is* change and nothing else, while volition *never is* change, but only points to it. The relation is that between being and becoming, between *sein* and *werden*."

J. W. BAIRD.

Psychology as a Natural Science. E. H. GRIFFIN. Presbyterian and Reformed Review, Oct., 1901, pp. 560–578.

Since psychology has taken its place among the natural sciences, its old conceptions have necessarily given place to new. Only such occurrences as are open to observation can be described, and analysed, and classified. Hence, modern psychology resolutely confines itself to phenomena, to states of consciousness as such, without regard to their ultimate ground or meaning. Indeed, some of its advocates have gone so far as to maintain that sensations and the ideas derivable from them, are the sole factors of consciousness. Thus Münsterberg has been led to regard the will as a mere complex of sensations—a position which ignores "the initiative, the selective, and preferential energy of volition." Moreover, Münsterberg himself admits elsewhere, that this "conglomerate of psycho-physical atoms" does not constitute the real will, but is only an artificial psychological abstraction therefrom. The modern psychologist defines the self or mind as the sum total of conscious processes. This characterization, however, proves to be inadequate from the epistemological point of view, for it was long since shown that the self, as a unifying activity of consciousness, is a necessary prerequisite of cognition. A rigid adherence to the phenomenal standpoint would confine psychology to the circle of our own ideas, and would forever bar our progress to a world of reality beyond. Psychology would then be powerless to investigate even such problems as perception, memory, and the logical function. For, perceptual and reasoned knowledge imply trans-subjective reference, and recognition implies a persisting personal identity. Should we then accept the prevailing natural history conception of psychology, to the extent of excluding all metaphysical postulates? This conception has advantages, it is true, in the study of strictly empirical problems, but it is inadequate for the investigation of mind in its entirety.

J. W. BAIRD.

ETHICAL.

Influence of the Idea of Æsthetic Proportion on the Ethics of Shaftesbury. M. F. LIBBY. Am. J. Ps., XII, 4, pp. 458–491.

The writer of this essay aims to show to what extent the allied notions of proportion, symmetry, and harmony, have influenced the ethical views of Shaftesbury, and thus to estimate somewhat the influence of these æsthetic notions upon ethical theory and upon conduct. Æsthetic proportion differs from proportion as understood in other branches of science in that the ground of comparisons of ratios is beauty, or some other modification of the æsthetic judgment. From Shaftesbury's point of view, ethics is a branch of æsthetics, and the notion of quantity can be strictly and practically applied to character and to moral or social relations. He would hold that moral ideas are legitimate art material. This is true, for art does not demand the "physically existing," nor even the "concrete," but the individual. It may deal with all that is of human interest. Moral ideas do, and have entered into poetry, painting, and music. That proportion can be applied to ideas is evident from the idea of time which may be measured mathematically. A just proportion between self and non-self is all important for Shaftesbury in literature, in enthusiasms, in ethical motivation, and in the contemplation of nature. His idea is not fanciful. Æsthetic norms can be applied. A mere thought or feeling can be measured by its effect, and wherever the notion of quantity or number can be applied, the notion of proportion is also applicable. Indirectly, moral ideas can be measured in the objective, by the study of historical and social institutions, and by their reflection in art. Ethics may be regarded as a branch of æsthetics in Shaftesbury's sense, in so far as the pleasure derived from proportion and symmetry is that of a disinterested spectator who watches the play of social forces. The tendency of Shaftesbury's writing is to make all nature the true art-object; artificiality is abolished and the phenomena of character and sociology are included in the conception of nature. A study of his ethics from the æsthetic point of view leads us to the following estimate of the chief points: Proportion, symmetry, and related æsthetic notions are applicable to moral phenomena. These æsthetic notions depend upon the native structure of the mind and constitute our moral sense. Virtue consists in preserving a due proportion in the affections; it produces harmony and happiness. The highest good is harmony on the highest plane of culture. It consists in a pure enjoyment of all nature, and demands stoical perfection. 'Natural' means symmetrical in relation to egoism and altruism, on whatever level of culture. Common sense is nature on a middle level. As a criticism, it may be said that in his exoteric ethics Shaftesbury does not exaggerate the value of æsthetic form, but he fails to recognize that those evolutionary activities which oppose form and destroy harmony on one level, lead to form and harmony on a higher level. He understood adequate forms, but did not understand provisional forms.

C. M. STORY.

Les principes moraux du droit. C. DUNAN. Rev. de Mét., IX., 6, pp. 700–726.

Right may be defined as that which ought to be, an ideal truth which reason opposes to brute reality. Different conceptions of reason imply different conceptions of right; and since the former reduce themselves to two, empiricism and idealism, the problem of right has had two solutions—the empirical and the idealistic. The most characteristic of the empirical solutions is that of Hobbes; and if phenomenalism were true, the law of existence would make men irreconcilable enemies, as that thinker held. For the essential characteristic of the phenomenal order is that in it things mutually exclude one another. But admitting that our existences have a substantial ground, the multiplicity of beings becomes reconcilable with the unity of the creation, and the antagonism of our appetites with the solidarity of our destiny. Empirical philosophy, knowing only facts, or what is, cannot derive from them the notion of right, or what ought to be. Idealism,' on the contrary, conceives of right as a morally necessary idea—not conditionally necessary, but absolutely so, anterior to experience, and superior to the mathematical and logical order on which the laws of nature depend. This moral necessity must, however, express itself within the facts of experience, and this it can never do completely since nature entirely spiritualized would not be nature. That is, right is an idea appertaining to the moral order—and nothing moral has part among the things that *are*, in the sense that experience gives to that word. That right may embody itself in experience, two conditions are necessary: first, that it should define itself by taking as fixed a form as possible for each individual; and second, that it should meet in the world of facts a force of intelligence which will support it, and which will have power enough to make it triumph. But this supposes the coercion of one person by another, this legislation, and this the state. "The rationale and function of the state is to restrain human passions, compel respect for justice, and secure the reign of right." But in that wide domain of action which the law cannot regulate, a state of war must exist between individuals, until the progress of the individual conscience disposes men to treat their fellows with a greater degree of justice and benevolence.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

HISTORICAL.

Lotze's Kausalitätslehre. EDMUND NEUENDORFF. Z. f. Ph., CXVI, pp. 41–144.

Hume derived the relation of cause and effect solely from experience. Kant thought causality was a concept of the understanding, though real causes were noumenal, and hence unknown. Fichte gave up the thing in-itself, because it was beyond causality. For Lotze, as for Herbart, the world of appearance was the effect of a real world. They attributed to causality a transcendental significance. Leibniz held to a plurality in

sensation, and Kant to a plurality in epistemology, while Lotze applied the concept of plurality to metaphysics. Transeunt causality was unsatisfactory, for it involved the view that single existences are rigidly substantial. He, therefore, thought causality was immanent, *i. e.*, that one state is produced from another state in the same existence. He recognized the universality of mechanism, but it is not clear what his view of freedom was.

The difficulty of telling how body affects mind, led him, at first, to think that their relation was different from the causality of material things. But again he says that any causality is inconceivable, and that cause and effect are for us two events in time. In the *Metaphysics* of 1841, he says the concept of causality cannot come from preceding concepts. The mind supplies the deficiency. Science is limited to the study of conditions, and the order of the world is due to the fact that things are part of one ground. The actuality of the ground is constituted by the metaphysical connection of causes, which is the result of purpose. Sometimes, however, he teaches the reality of the causal process, and that there is no external force, law existing only in the actual process. On the whole, his early position is in close accord with Geulincx's 'occasionalism.' In the *Microcosmus*, however, he stands nearer to Hume and Kant. 'Occasionalism' is here but the last word of the understanding, while reason is led to posit a unity of ultimate reality—for the reciprocal relations of all things demand an absolute monism. The commensurability of individual things depends upon their worth for the world process. Their relations are possible, because the unity is spiritual. Free immanent causality is found only in the human will, and all substances are ultimately spiritual. Individuals are effective, because they are centers of force of a spiritual absolute, and are both active and representative. The absolute produces one state from another in order to maintain a certain inner equilibrium. But as this process is continuous, the absolute remains forever unsatisfied. This process of equilibrium sometimes has its ground in the qualitative nature of the individuals; and, again, in the unity of the plan in which the individuals are mere moments. Its purpose is always ethical. But we cannot comprehend the greatness of this idea, nor the inner state from which it arises.

From the standpoint of 'occasionalism,' Lotze sometimes admitted qualitative distinctions between psychic and corporeal atoms, but, again, from the transcendental standpoint he regarded all as parts of one true being, which had sensation, feeling, and will, and was, indeed, the personal God. So that his system is called by some, monism; by others, pluralism; and by still others a vacillation between the two. Though all individuals are parts of a single absolute, he denies pantheism, which he thinks cannot recognize individual values. Again, there are religious, æsthetic, and metaphysical influences which incline him to pluralism. For the human soul has worth, and things act reciprocally. This is thinkable only in a monism, but actual only in a pluralism. This doctrine of being demands that reals stand in relation to other reals, and be able to

know and feel the value of their own states. The degree of reality depends upon the perfection of the thing, as with Spinoza. Relation to another is an essential element in being, as it is not with Leibniz. With his pluralility of reals, blended in a higher unity, Lotze thought he had reconciled the monism of Spinoza with the pluralism of Leibniz.

In the *Metaphysic* of 1879 there is no important change in respect to the causal problem, but he reaches a kind of metaphysical scepticism. There is only a single standpoint for the consideration of being and becoming. The cause exhausts itself to produce the effect, and in the continual flow of reciprocity and becoming, the thing is reduced to a mere appearance. As in the *Microcosmus*, reciprocity leads to the idea of the infinite spiritual absolute. The tendency in the ontological and cosmological investigation is toward pantheism. He agrees with realism that there is a world of things outside the human ego, and with idealism that only spirits exist in the world. He does not show how the absolute can give a metaphysical place to personalities outside itself, but says that as this concerns the creation of reality, it is insoluble. He criticizes Leibniz's view of the best possible world, and calls attention to the functional importance of the individual in the world process. Is it purpose which is the ultimate principle of causality? We do not know, for we do not understand the idea which is working itself out in the world. This is his metaphysical scepticism. In the *Metaphysics* the concept of reciprocity requires monism alone. But yet he does not entirely set aside the pluralistic view. The absolute is all, yet there are also individual existences. The solution of the causal problem is not final. N. E. TRUMAN.

Das Causalproblem bei Hume und Kant. ROBERT REININGER. Kant-Studien, VI, 4, pp. 427–458.

In this discussion of the relation between Hume and Kant, some of the important points are the following: (1) Hume approaches the problem of causality quite unprejudiced, whereas Kant is biased by his belief that if the objectivity of the causal principle is overthrown, natural science becomes impossible. (2) Kant's investigation is much more far-reaching than Hume's. Hume considers merely the question as to the validity of our inferences from experience, accepting the uniformity of that experience as an ultimate datum. Kant seeks to analyze this datum and thus raises the question of the nature and possibility of experience. (3) Kant and Hume agree in holding (*a*) that all causal judgments are synthetic, and (*b*) that only experience can give us the relation between the particular cause and its effect. (4) It is essential to distinguish carefully two kinds of necessity in the causal relation: the internal necessity uniting a particular effect with a particular cause; and the external necessity (everything that happens must have some cause). Both kinds are recognized in the *Treatise*, but Kant's criticism of Hume is vitiated by his failure to distinguish them. He under-

stands Hume to have reasoned thus: The special causal relations are not cognizable *a priori*, and hence are not necessary; but if the causal relation is not necessary in any special case, then it is not necessary in general that every event should have a cause. This interpretation is in part correct. It is true both that Hume's criticism of the causal concept begins with an analysis of the particular causal judgment, and that his doubt of the (external) necessity of the causal principle was suggested by the impossibility of proving logically the (internal) necessity of the special causal relation. But Kant is mistaken in supposing that Hume makes the necessity of the causal principle conditional upon the possibility of deducing the principle *a priori*. Hume would have been quite satisfied if he could have given an empirical deduction, if he could have found an "impression" to furnish a basis for our idea of an active force. (5) It is one of Hume's great services that he pointed out the anthropomorphic origin of the idea of active force. He seems not to have seen, however, that our conception of force, instead of being a baseless assumption, rests upon our immediate consciousness in acts of volition. The fundamental thought of Kant's epistemology, that objectivity is nothing but necessary subjectivity, has its ultimate ground in this natural projection of our *Willensgefühl*. Here, as in many other cases, we must be content to see "the anthropomorphic character of our *Weltbegriff*" without "being able to eliminate it."

ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

L'éternité des âmes dans la philosophie de Spinoza. V. BROCHARD. Rev. de Mét., IX, 6, pp. 688–699.

That the second half of Spinoza's *Ethics*, Pt. V, is not concerned with immortality in the ordinary sense of the word is clear from Prop. XXI, in which memory and imagination are regarded as not extending beyond the present life. Eternity of the soul is attributed by Spinoza solely to its essence; but the view that this eternity of essence is an impersonal eternity, or a mere reabsorption into the Universal Soul, seems to be overthrown by the following considerations: (1) Both divisions of Part V of the *Ethics* deal with man's happiness—the first half with his happiness in the present life, and the second half with blessedness in the life eternal. The first half is unmistakably concerned with the happiness of man as an individual and personal being; why suppose that the second half does not also treat of the individual? (2) Expressions like 'blessedness,' 'salvation,' and 'glory' (Prop. XXXVI, Scholium), plainly refer to an existence in which the individual is still a self-conscious being. (3) The statement in Prop. XXIII, Scholium, "we feel and know that we are eternal," shows that the knowledge of ourselves as eternal is analogous to an empirical intuition, and is therefore knowledge of a determinate being. (4) That the eternal essence of the soul is accompanied by consciousness is affirmed in several passages, among them being Prop. XXXIV, Scholium, Prop. XXX, and especially Prop. XXXI, Scholium, where Spinoza says that the more completely we

recognize things "under the form of eternity," the more completely are we conscious of ourselves and of God. The soul is not lost in the Divine, but is eternally present to itself (V, XXIX, Sch.).—M. Hamelin has shown that between Spinozism and Greek philosophy there is a closer connection than is ordinarily supposed. Aristotle's statement that the soul is the form of the body differs little from the Spinozistic description of the soul as the idea of the body. But, as was shown above, M. Hamelin is mistaken in holding that Spinoza adopted the Aristotelian view of immortality as impersonal and partial. Between Plato, too, and Spinoza there are points of similarity. The intelligible world of Plato is identical with the Spinozistic world of essences. But for Plato souls are not ideas of God; they are not infinite in number, and they are not, as for Spinoza, united to a body and individuated by it, but can dwell in, and animate successively, the most diverse bodies. We must conclude, then, that the differences between Aristotle and Plato on the one hand, and Spinoza on the other, are so great that Aristotle and Plato cannot be regarded as the source of Spinozism. The two can be brought into connection only through an intermediary doctrine. This middle term we get in the philosophy of Plotinus, where we find for the first time the doctrine that souls have an individual and distinct existence in the Universal Soul, prior to their existence in the body. Plotinus's transformation of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle was possible only through the idea of the Infinite, an idea foreign to Greek thought, and of Oriental or Jewish origin. The God of Spinoza is not abstract and impersonal substance, but possesses, besides the two attributes of thought, and extension, an infinity of attributes which escape us. However different God's will and understanding may be from ours, they are will and understanding nevertheless. And as Spinoza has nowhere spoken of ideas unaccompanied by consciousness, or of the intelligible apart from intelligence, it is not unreasonable to suppose God possesses consciousness and personality.

M. S. MACDONALD.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Psychology Normal and Morbid. By CHARLES A. MERCIER. London, Swan Sonnenschein and Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1901.—pp. xvi, 518.

The author, who is a well-known alienist, wrote this book because he could find nowhere in normal psychology the necessary aid to the study of the abnormal mind. One can but admire the courage (though one doubt the discretion) of the student who leaves his own work to gather into orderly and convenient form the gleanings from a foreign field. Mercier writes as an alienist. His psychology is, for the most part, of the common-sense sort. He does not stick at definitions or multiply unnecessary concepts.

Various general modes of consciousness—sensation, thought, will, desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, memory—correspond to certain phases of the experience of the organism; reception, rearrangement, and 'emission' of motion are correlated, respectively, with sensation, thought, and will; modification of neural structure gives memory; the struggle to maintain the species is accompanied by desire; favorable (or unfavorable) reactions mean, in consciousness, pleasure (or pain). Mind is a part of the organic machine, and is to be considered as a set of functions or faculties. Each of these functions or faculties is taken up in turn, its essential characteristics noted, and afterwards its 'faults'—defects and disorders—are dwelt upon. The plan of the book is simple, and the treatment is straightforward.

Nearly half the volume is given over to a discussion of 'thought.' The handling of this subject is thoroughly English. Thinking is defined as "the establishment of a relation of likeness, or a relation of unlikeness between mental states." All thinking, *i. e.*, is comparison. (Cf. Locke's theory of knowledge.) The influence of Mill, of Bain, of Spencer, and of Maudsley is apparent throughout the book. The author's justification for giving nearly half the volume over to logical questions lies in his belief that logic as "science of reasoning processes generally" must fall under the "science of mental processes," *i. e.*, psychology. He makes his slip in his fundamental postulate: 'all thinking is the establishment of relations between mental states.' The postulate itself is a logical one and is couched in logical terms. When, therefore, the processes of syllogistic and axiomatic reasoning are reduced to the "primary act of thought," *i. e.*, the assimilation of relations, the author has not yet reached psychology, but only his logical and epistemological ultimates. And even if the establishment of a simple relation be conceded to be an ultimate mental operation, we still have to exclude from psychology the elaborate discussions of the 'forms of thought.'

Quite apart from the psychological value of this section of the book, one can but praise the vigorous treatment, the concreteness, and the first-hand grasp of the subject, which is made evident, at times, by the homely picturesqueness of the illustrations, as when one of the fallacies of immediate inference is illuminated by the hypothetical judgment "If I have found that my woolen jerseys have shrunk so much in washing that I cannot get them on," etc. This logic of the wash-tub (if it is not taken too seriously) undoubtedly has a distinct pedagogical if not a psychological value.

The 'faults' of reasoning are dealt with at some length, but strangely enough, application to morbid conditions is almost entirely lacking.

'Certainty,' although it is inaccurately defined as the "cohesion of a mental relation," is treated with discretion. Belief is shown to be a function of many variables—the uniformity of experience, frequency, recency, vividness, and temporary and temperamental conditions of consciousness. Unnecessary energy is wasted in disproving the fallacious argument that belief is to be determined by the "numerical doctrine of chances." A lack of finality in true psychological thinking is shown in the discussion of apperception. Though he accepts the Herbartian doctrine of apperceptive systems, the author refuses to believe that these systems have any power of incorporating new facts into their midst. The truth is rather, he says naïvely, that the "subject" takes the new facts and puts them into their systematic setting. The somewhat lengthy account of belief, of the degrees of certainty, and the conditions upon which these depend, furnishes a reasonable basis for the explanation of morbid beliefs, or delusions. The latter are shown to be different only in degree from normal erroneous beliefs. They differ chiefly in the scope of the subjective factor, in the relative abeyance of 'experience,' in the determination of the morbid belief. This is an apt illustration of the importance of proceeding from the normal to the abnormal, from the better known to the lesser known. Although it is a trite thing to say, mental pathology would be in a much healthier condition to-day if it made a rule of following this procedure. The classification of delusions is psychological, and, undoubtedly, it finds good clinical justification.

Mercier's opening sections on volition are not very promising. The mental-mechanical parallelism of attention ("the awareness of our own activity"), and 'emitted motion' is unsound. The barbarous antithesis of 'reflex' and 'voluntary' attention, corresponding to the reflex and voluntary emission of motion, and the hard and fast distinction between instinct and reason are to be looked upon with suspicion. Willing or choice turns out to be 'representation' and a high degree of attention; the latter dependent upon the 'relative repletion' of 'nervous mechanisms' and of an 'unmechanized' highest center whose activity is "in a special degree identified in consciousness with the activity of self." The treatment of volition, desire, instinct, attention, and choice turns out to be much more adequate and accurate than the initial pages lead the reader to expect.

Although it contains very little that is new, it is a good straightforward discussion of these difficult topics. The explanation of the disorders of volition lays more stress on hypothetical alterations in the nervous system than on the psychological analysis of the disorders. The major assumption, *i. e.*, that the functional correlate of will is the emission of motion from the brain, is somewhat crude. Again, the tendency to regard instinct, desire, will, etc., as 'faculties' leads to the view that various mental operations depend upon the functioning of definite bits of 'nervous mechanism.' Obsessions, *e. g.*, are explained by way of 'parasitic mechanisms' which are flooded with motion. This is too much like pigeon-holing thoughts.

Memory, especially 'structural' or organic memory, is discussed at length. The author makes the mistake of assuming a necessary comparison in recognition. The disorders of memory are rather poorly classified.

As regards pleasure and pain the point of view is essentially the same as Grant Allen's. Most attention is paid to the biological signification of these feelings. Against the bodily-feeling theory of emotion, Mercier wisely insists on the perceptual or 'intellectual' factor, and in James's attack upon Bain's theory of pleasure-pain as motives in volition, he sturdily champions the cause of his countryman. The general evolutional conception of emotion, as the reaction upon environment, is reaffirmed. The reader will recall Mercier's elaborate classification of the emotions on Spencerian principles (*Mind*, 1884, and *The Nervous System and the Mind*, 1888). The old point of view is still maintained with some modifications. (Here and elsewhere no references are given. The book would be much more convenient if it contained both references and footnotes.)

The volume closes with a more or less unsystematic account of the relation of affection to sensation, attention, thought, will, and memory, and an analysis of the "subject consciousness" together with its morbid conditions.

Mercier's work grows on one as one reads. It is much more valuable than a cursory glance would suggest. The author's psychological vision is limited, but he has, nevertheless, a distinct point of view, and he writes consistently and clearly. There is no doubt but the alienist will derive general aid from the book. The more credit is due Dr. Mercier because the field is new, because systematic works on psychology have not had in view the specific needs of the mental pathologist. Perhaps the most important feature of the volume is its insistençe on insanity as a psycho-physical disorder to be explained in the light of the *normal* psycho-physical functions of the individual.

Mental pathology certainly owes something to our author's persistent efforts to lay a more abiding foundation to what he conceives to be the "Science of Alienism." *Psychology Normal and Morbid* is unquestionably a better book than *The Nervous System and the Mind*; it is, moreover, a more important contribution to the psychology of the abnormal individual.

I. M. BENTLEY.

Whence and Whither. An Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul, its Origin, and Destiny. By PAUL CARUS, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1900.—pp. vi, 188.

The religious influence of the material world, experienced by man from the primitive age of wonder to that of Goethe and Wordsworth, is increasingly recognized, and prompts to frequent constructions of cosmic psychology and theology. The speculative, it must be admitted, is just now less popular than the scientific method, as witness the productions of writers like J. J. Murphy and Professor John Fiske. Though Mr Huxley and J. S. Mill despaired of the physical world as unmoral and even irreligious, 'scientific bases of faith' are frequently appearing, and many thoughtful people believe that religion and morals will in the future be formed solidly on cosmic facts. Secure as are the gains of rational psychology and philosophy, scientific study of the material word is hopeful of results as great if not greater. This little book of Dr. Carus is a cosmic psychology and theology. Like J. Strada, the author derives the mind and religion of man through the cosmic process from the divine idea, or pure form, the *logos*, and declares himself not a pantheist, but a nomotheist. God is the "eternal norm," the nomos (*νόμος*) of existence. "Man's existenceas a sentient and rational being is a matter of form. Not sentiency but spirituality is his characteristic feature. Man is neither matter nor energy, but a peculiar form of matter and energy." "His soul has been impressed upon him by the moulding influences of the uniformities of nature, the laws of form." According to the author, subjectivity in man arrives through the ascending stages of subjectivity in nature. As Dr. Carus is a monist, and matter is but the outside and mind the inside of the same thing, his monism is at bottom spiritualistic. It is true that monism usually lapses into materialism. We find, *e. g.*, that Haeckel's monism is materialistic. But even Haeckel speaks of *atom-seele*, and endows atoms with sensation and will. That matter is an objective expression of the Divine will and idea, that it is a machine for the transformation of Supreme Energy (will) into life, instinct, mind in animals higher up, into human self-consciousness and ever clearer personality, may be admitted. But in the case of both J. Strada and Dr. Carus, the distress begins when we try to trace the passage of this transformed energy in nature into the intensely subjective personality of man. Declining the aid of introspection, leaning too heavily upon scientific observation of facts and laws of the material world, the latter treats cavalierly the result of rational and ethical inquest into the nature of the soul. Truth, he says, cannot be based upon introspection, but must ultimately rest on observation. But assuredly we must start with some knowledge of the soul and its powers before we can observe external facts and construct a cosmic psychology. All attempts at any psychology must begin with an inventory of the soul's capacities. It is at the true psychological moment, viz.: the point of arrival at the ego, through the cosmic process, that Dr. Carus manifests tergiversation. The problem, it

is true, is not his alone. How the human ego arrives, whether mediately or immediately, must be forever a mystery, as how the finite comes from the Infinite.

The author defines the soul as a system of sentient symbols. "Man's thoughts are sentient images of the things and relations of the objective world, and thinking is simply a combining of these sentient images." This seems but a penurious account of all man's thoughts, which wander through eternity and build the systems of science and philosophy and create all the opulence of poetry and art. Dr. Carus remarks: "The soul is not that which feels and thinks and acts, but is the feeling itself, the thinking itself, and the acting itself." Is there, then, thinking without a thinker, acting without an agent, feeling without a subject who feels? He says, however, in another place, "Every subject feels its own feelings" (not those of another subject). He, however, concludes: "There is no metaphysical unity in an ego . . . which would be a continuous unifying power." The personal soul is then only *disjecta membra*. The author speaks of God as superpersonal, in order to escape anthropomorphism. But to be superpersonal is to be less than personal, since personality is the hightest conception of being. Rather should we say with Lotze, "Perfect personality is God." The study of the material world and of the phenomena of life, more and more relieve the problems of *Whence and Whither*, and attempts to find in the cosmic process and the essence of matter, confirmations of reason and feeling are far from being unfruitful. The passage from the subjective side of the material world to the subjectivity of the personal soul does not here seem to be clearly indicated, nor is the soul apprehended as unity or as subject.

CHARLES MELLEN TYLER.

Inductive Sociology: A Syllabus of Methods, Analyses, and Classifications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws. By F. H. GIDDINGS. New York, The Macmillan Co.; London, Macmillan & Co., 1901.—pp. xviii, 302.

"The object of this book is to present a scheme of inductive method, a somewhat detailed analysis and classification of social facts, and a tentative formulation of the more obvious laws of social activity, all as a basis for further inductive studies" (p. ix). The study of sociology, which has claimed so much attention during the last decade, has constantly been criticized, on the one hand, because it dealt with generalizations insufficiently established instead of concrete facts; or on the other hand, because it was concerned with data which properly belonged to some already existing branch of study. That there are social facts which can be studied accurately, and which have not been satisfactorily studied by any other science, has always been claimed by Professor Giddings; still we turn to the present volume in the hope of finding a better proof of this position than was afforded by his previous works.

The idea of a book which shall guide the student in the study of con-

crete social facts is not a new one, but earlier attempts to embody this idea have been notably unsuccessful. The excellence of the present volume lies, first, in the fact that it is based on actual inductive work which the author has been carrying on with his students, and secondly, in that the material is presented by one who has thought through the general problems which here are examined from the standpoint of concrete studies.

As compared with the author's earlier volumes, the present work is more limited in its scope. "Studies of the historical evolution of society, and of the deeper problems of causation are not included" (p. x). Problems of social evolution are peculiarly interesting, but undue attention to them has been the bane of this nascent science; they have invited speculation, to the detriment of scientific research; to turn the young student from these questions to matters of fact is certainly a merit of this volume. Aside from this omission, Part I, on "Social Population," is treated on the same lines as in the *Principles* of *Sociology;* Part III also contains little material which is not already outlined in the *Principles*, or in the *Elements* already published. Part II, on "The Social Mind," deserves the attention of students of philosophy. Here the author does not, it is true, modify essentially his earlier standpoints; he does, however, so elaborate them as to make them clearer and more useful to the student. The doctrine that society is based on similarity, and on the recognition of that similarity, the doctrine of the consciousness of kind, is fundamental in Professor Giddings's studies. For him the consciousness of similarity is the law of gravitation in the social world; if "friendship," to use Plato's phrase, is the result of likeness, then we may follow the author in the superstructure which he rears on this foundation. Perhaps the reader will turn with most interest to the last section, Part IV, on "Social Welfare." In spite of many acute suggestions I find this the least satisfactory part of the book, and here, I believe, more than elsewhere, the system presented in outline in this book will profit by further studies.

The book is just what its title says, a *syllabus* of methods, classifications, etc. The statements are so brief and formal, that they require such personal directions as the author might give to his students in order to make them effective. Occasionally, the English is a little forced, as when "characterization" is used to mean the formation of character (p. 59), or "practical resemblance" to mean resemblance in mode of action (p. 4). Perhaps such liberty should be allowed, when a new science is in progress of construction.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

The Principles of Morality, and the Departments of the Moral Life. By WILHELM WUNDT. Translated by MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1901.—pp. 308.

This work forms the third volume of the English translation of Wundt's

Ethik, and covers Parts III and IV of the German work, as indicated respectively in the two parts of the above title. The translator's excellent work in connection with this series has been already recognized, and the consequent expectations with which the reader approaches the present volume will be fully realized. It is no light task to translate the precise thought of an author into foreign phrase and idiom, preserving those nice distinctions and fine shades of meaning which tend to become obscure the moment they pass into another tongue, and at the same time to give some impression of the spirit of the author's work and the characteristic features of his style. The present translation has succeeded most happily in these respects, and will no doubt prove a valuable contribution to the English library of foreign authors.

It may seem ungracious to criticise one or two minor points in a work which manifests so many excellences, and yet perhaps it may be of some interest to point out a few phrases concerning which there may be at least a difference of opinion as to the most exact rendering of the German text. In the translator's "Preface" there is the statement: "Throughout the section on Legal Norms (pp. 160–192), much of the significance of the discussion rests on the fact that the German word *Recht* means both 'law' and 'right.' The difficulty thus presented to the English reader has been somewhat lessened, it is hoped, by translating the phrase *subjektives Recht* 'subjective law, or right,' and *objektives Recht* 'objective right, or law.'" Would there not be less confusion in the mind of the English reader if the phrases were translated simply 'subjective right' and 'objective right' throughout the whole discussion, for when the phrase '*objektives Recht*' is equivalent to positive law, the context will in every case show it unmistakably. Moreover, Wundt generally adds by way of a more exact statement some such explanatory phrase as 'the legal order, etc.,' p. 176. Again in the title of section (*c*), p. 116, the phrase *Die Verkettung der unsittlichen Motive* is translated 'the connection of the unmoral motives.' The exposition which runs through this section gives the impression of a natural linking together of these unmoral motives which the term 'connection' does not fully convey, but which the term *Die Verkettung* does. The word 'concatenation' would appear perhaps a trifle strained; the 'interrelation' or 'the affinity of the immoral motives' might express more adequately the point in question. Still another phrase, the title of section (*b*), p. 132, *Gebietende und verbietende Normen*, is translated 'positive and negative norms.' Would it not be better to render the phrase 'mandatory and prohibitive norms'? This would seem especially fitting, inasmuch as these words are commonly used by ethical writers almost as technical terms. However, a minor difference of opinion or of taste in translating must yield to the deeper feeling of appreciation and congratulation upon a work so admirably done.

The translation bears upon each page a reference to the number of the corresponding page in the German edition. This is a great convenience

for comparative reference. A carefully compiled index also adds to the value of the English translation.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

The Play of Man. By KARL GROOS. Translated with the author's coöperation by ELIZABETH L. BALDWIN, with a preface by J. MARK BALDWIN. New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1901.—pp. ix, 406.

Professor Groos's works on play have been so widely read since their first appearance in German, that it is unnecessary to do more than recall in the briefest manner the contents of *Die Spiele der Menschen*, now appearing in translation. The author's psychological criterion of play is that the activities and capacities involved in it shall be exercised purely for the sake of the resulting pleasure; his theory of its biological significance is that it represents preparatory, 'experimental' exercise of various instincts essential to adult life. The bulk of the work is given to an interesting discussion and classification of human games and sports with reference to the different powers and impulses whose exercise they involve.

It is an ungrateful act to criticise a translation; the translator's task is always an unselfish and laborious one. But in the present case the reviewer cannot omit to mention the fact that many rather serious errors mar the work. When we read on page 232 of the translation that Sully and Ribot attempt to combine the two theories of the comic, that of the feeling of superiority and that of contradiction, "by deriving the more refined sense of superiority from the first exaggeration, progressively excluding the latter by mental play with contraries," we are not exactly enlightened. Turning to the original we find that the passage reads: "*Sully und Ribot suchen sie in der Weise zu vereinigen, dass sie das triumphirende Gefühl der Ueberlegenheit als die pimitivere Erscheinung auffassen, aus der sich erst* [is this the 'first' of the translator's rendering] *mit der Zeit die feinere Freude am Komischen entwickelt habe, wobei das Ueberlegenheitsgefühl immer mehr von dem intellectuellem Spiel mit dem Widersprechenden verdrängt worden sei.*" Further, on page 362 of the translation, Spencer is reported as follows: "It is characteristic of nervous processes, he says, that the superfluous integration of ganglion cells should be accompanied by an inherited readiness to discharge." One wonders what the force of 'inherited' may be here, until on consulting the original one finds that it is an *übermässige Bereitwilligkeit* to discharge, with which the ganglion cells are credited, and that there is no trace of any word in the sentence which could possibly have suggested 'inherited.' In the case of the following blunder the operating psychological causes are more apparent: on page 375 we read, "the longer this natural education continues, the more *vivid* do the inherited capacities become." The word translated 'vivid,' to the utter destruction of the sentence's meaning, is '*bildsam*'—not pictorial, but *plastic*, a not unnatural confusion of the arts. A number

of equally important errors are revealed by the most superficial comparison of translation and original.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

Gustav Theodor Fechner. Von W. WUNDT. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1901.—pp. 92.

For the centenary of Fechner's birth, Wundt was chosen to deliver the commemorative address. The address has been published, together with a series of added comments and personal reminiscences, and an excellent picture of the Fechner monument in Leipzig. All who know anything of Fechner's colossal and painstaking work will read with delight Wundt's appreciative sketch of his long life devoted to science, philosophy, and religion. Particularly to the younger generation, who know Fechner only through two or three of his many published works, will this authoritative estimate of the man and his achievements be welcome, all the more as it is written by an intimate friend. Fechner's life, though outwardly uneventful, is exceedingly interesting; the early years of struggle and breaking toil, years devoted almost exclusively to scientific problems, the immense output, "at a moderate estimate, three or four volumes yearly," the final triumph, in the appointment to the professorship in physics, the failure of health, the partial loss of sight, the years of suffering that wrought out the philosopher, and the later period which saw the publication of various works on philosophy, psychophysics, biology, and æsthetics. Attention is called to Fechner's deep religious and poetical nature, his absolute scrupulousness and candor, and his freedom from bias and dogmatism. Wundt shows that the underlying thought in the *Zend-Avesta* and the *Elemente* was the same; a fact that the student of the *Psychophysik* is apt to overlook. The latter work was really designed as an empirical demonstration of the truth of the author's *Weltanschauung*, as an "inductive system of proof for his philosophy."

I. M. BENTLEY.

The Principles of Knowledge. With remarks on The Nature of Reality. By JOHNSON ESTEP WALTER. West Newton, Pa., Johnston & Penney, 1901.—pp. 302.

In this book Mr. Walter presents to the public the result of his belief that "since the idealistic diversion from Locke, led by Berkeley and Hume, there has remained an unfilled space for a consistent and adequate theory of *a posteriori* dualistic realism," and this work, he says, "may be regarded as, in part, an attempt to supply the proper theory." The author's views are to be elaborated in two volumes, the second of which is expected soon to follow, and to treat of the knowledge of the extra mental or external, and the extremes of knowledge. The present volume is divided into two books of six and five chapters respectively. These chapters deal with the following subjects: "Cognition of Present Mental States or Con-

sciousness;" "Cognition of Past Mental States or Memory;" "Cognition of Subjective Time;" "Is the Knowledge of Mental States Relative?" "Classification of the Mental States and their Chief Compositions;" "Cognition of Real Mind;" "Is the Knowledge of Real Mind Relative?" "General Nature of Intellection;" "Perception;" "Imagination;" "Logical Thought;" and "Language and Symbols."

A footnote to the title-page of Book I explains that the term "mind" is used in the broadest sense, as denoting the whole spiritual nature of man. Thus having indicated his general point of view, the author goes on to consider cognition of real mental states; and, in the first place, he controverts the assumption made by Hamilton and others, "that the function or faculty of knowledge, or the intellect, is a faculty coördinate with the faculties of sensibility and volition; or is as independent of, or distinct from, these two faculties, as either of them is from the other." The consciousness of any modification of mind belongs, he holds, to the modification itself, "is in and of it, is implied in it as a constituent element, or is identical with it."

Adopting, then, what may be said to be the position of modern psychology regarding the constitutent elements and the modes of their combination in mind and consciousness, he proceeds after a rather tedious fashion to apply it in detail to special and particular acts of perception and affection with an altogether too liberal reference to different opinion. This fault is further aggravated by the fact that much of the opinion is only quoted for the sake of being refuted, and really adds nothing to the main discussion. Toward the close of the chapter he refers in passing to the theory of unconscious states or activities of mind, dismissing alike as untenable the theory of "unconscious sensation" and "unconscious cerebration." The next chapter deals with the cognition of past mental states, or memory; but as this phase of the discussion receives a much more intimate and coherent treatment later on in the inquiry into the "Cognition of Real Mind," it will be unnecessary to take account of it here. As to our cognition of subjective time, the author thinks that Kant's *a priori* doctrine of time teaches what is "unwarrantable and untenable." In the first place, he says, "there is no sufficient reason for imputing any creative power to the mind, even as respects only phenomena and appearances. There is not sufficient evidence in the assertions furnished by the Kantian school to regard subjective time as a product of the mind's own synthesis or creation. Neither is there sufficient ground for the "severance or unlikeness and alienation between phenomena or thought and mental reality, as it is assumed by the Kantian theory of time." As a substitute for this erroneous Kantian doctrine, Mr. Walter advances the theory—a main point in his own doctrine—"that the idea of time is itself temporal; that the presenting thought possesses as its own property what it presents." "The measurement or estimation of subjective time" he here refuses, however, to go into fully.

As to the question "Is the Knowledge of the Mental States Relative?"

four distinct points must be taken into account in our consideration of it. "Does contrast or comparison always accompany the consciousness of a mental state? Does it necessarily accompany? If necessarily, what kind or degree of it? How far is the knowledge of the individual state or term affected or modified by the comparison in which it is known?" It is not an easy matter to discern Mr. Walter's own views regarding these points (and many others), because of the frequency and variety of his references to the views of others, and through the further fact that what little is directly positive in his own opinions is so almost hopelessly beset on all sides by contentions and intrinsic negativity. It would appear, however, that it seems to him "necessary to admit that difference of degree or difference of quality not only always exists in consciousness, but is indispensable to it." Still sensations "have an absolute content or quality." "Surely nothing is more important in a relation than the terms related. . . . Remove them and the relation collapses as a bridge when its abutments are washed away." Thus is the doctrine of a creative function in the relating activity of mind dismissed, and of such kind are the argumentative supports that he gives the final position that our knowledge is relative and also absolute.

The discussions of Chapter IV, which deals with the "Classification of the Mental States and Their Chief Compositions," is so much of a piece with the treatment exemplified above; it is so encumbered with quotation from diverse sources—from Spencer, Bain, Lotze, Hamilton, Locke, James, Ziehen, Kant—and is, withal, so barren of results at first hand, that it calls for no special notice, beyond the statement that its final deduction would seem to be that "sensations, emotions, and volitions, and the reproduction of them by memory, constitute the original data of intellection." "The intellect furnishes no matter or form from itself." But one other chapter—"On the Cognition of Real Mind"—need detain us, and this only because after it has run more than half its length it really "descends to consider (its subject) with more particularity" than is generally adopted, and for the further reason that it gives a neater treatment to special features that are elsewhere (as in Chap. II above), handled laboriously and confusingly. To begin with, as he says in this more specific undertaking, we know mind as a temporal, causational, and spatial unit. Our knowledge of the permanence of mind is a composition of immediate and mediate knowledge; immediate through consciousness, mediate through memory. The "only adequate or rational account that can be given of the belief in the mind's past is, not that it is the product of repeated inference, but is the expression of the fact that the mind had a past and has endured from the past to the present." Kant's dictum that "such properties as belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses" is an unjustifiable and mischievous assumption. "The consciousness of the exertion (*i. e.*, the mind's exertion of itself) and the effect is a perfectly clear experience, wholly distinct and easily distinguished from the notion of mere succession."

This causation within the sphere of the mind is the beginning of the notion of causation. The power coming through this practice of effort by the mind "is the backbone of moral character." "Every mental faculty over which the will exercises control is capable, by subjective laws, of action which is not controlled by the will." Yet the control of the mind over the course of its thought "is not all-embracing and entire." "Kant's doctrine of space and extension is as fantastic and unwarrantable as his doctrine of time." Lotze is no improvement in this regard. Professor Bowne and the ubiquitous Hamilton, Leibniz, Spinoza, and James, are either quaint in their inferences regarding spatial qualities in consciousness, are burdening themselves with factitious difficulties, or are flatly wrong.

It would be a quite fair and sufficient characterization of any part of Mr. Walter's book to say that to get an idea of its contents it would be necessary only to read the titles of his chapters, to recall the body of authoritative opinion on the subject, and to remember that he differs from all previously expressed opinion.

T. D. BOLGER.

The Foundations of Belief: being Notes introductory to the Study of Theology. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. Eighth edition, revised, with a new Introduction and Summary. London, New York, and Bombay, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901.—pp. xxxvi, 399.

In the new introduction to this well-known work, the original edition of which was reviewed in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (Vol. IV, pp. 311–315), Mr. Balfour restates the essential point of his argument in a form which ought to go far to remove the misunderstandings which attended its original presentation. "The method of proof depends essentially upon the principle that for a creed to be truly consistent, there must exist a correspondence between the account it gives of the origin of its beliefs and the estimate it entertains of their value; in other words, there must be harmony between the accepted value of results and the accepted theory of causes. . . . If, underlying the rational apparatus by which scientific beliefs are formally justified, there is a wholly non-rational machinery by which they are in fact produced, if we are of opinion that in the last resort our stock of convictions is determined by the blind interaction of natural forces, and, so far as we know, by these alone, then there is a discord between one portion of our scheme of thought and another, between our estimate of values and our theory of origins, which may properly be described as inconsistency" (pp. xviii–xix). To take the ethical application of the argument, "the ordinarily 'accepted value' of the moral law, of moral sentiments, of responsibility, of repentance, self-sacrifice, and high resolve, clashes hopelessly with any doctrine of origins which should trace the pedigree of ethics through the long-drawn developments produced by natural selection, till it be finally lost in some material, and therefore, non-moral beginning. In this case as in the other two [those of Logic and Æsthetics], we can only reach a con-

sistency (relative, indeed, and imperfect at the best) if we assume behind, or immanent in, the chain of causes cognizable by science, a universal Spirit shaping them to a foreseen end" (p. xx). "The line of argument thus indicated is the exact opposite of one with which we are all very familiar. We are often told—and it may be properly told—that this or that statement is true, this or that practice laudable, because it comes to us with a divine sanction, or because it is in accordance with nature. In the argument on which I am insisting the movement of thought is reversed. Starting from the conception that knowledge is indeed real, that the moral law does indeed possess authority, it travels towards the conviction that the source from which they spring can itself be neither irrational nor unmoral. In the one case, we infer validity from origin; in the other, origin from validity" (pp. xx–xxi).

This restatement of the position differentiates it clearly from the 'Will-to-believe' position with which it has been frequently confused. In particular, it sets in a much clearer light the real significance of the "doctrine of needs" which has aroused so much discussion. "This method assumes a kind of harmony between the knowing self and the reality to be known, which seems only plausible if both are part of a common design; while again, if such a design is to be accepted at all, it can hardly be confined to the self as knowing subject, but must embrace other and not less notable aspects of our complex personality" (p. xxix).

J. S.

The Meditations, and Selections from the Principles of Phi osophy of René Descartes. Translated by JOHN VEITCH. Reprint edition. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co.; London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1901.—pp. xx.

"An authorized reprint of Veitch's translation of Descartes's *Discourse on Method* has already been published as No. 38 of the Religion of Science Library. The present volume is a reprint of the remainder of Veitch's translation of Descartes's representative speculative treatises. The *Meditations on the First Philosophy* are translated entire, and the preface and the first part of the *Principles of Philosophy*, together with selections from the second, third, and fourth parts of that work . . . as well as an appendix containing part of Descartes's reply to the *Second Objections* (viz., his formal demonstrations of the existence of Diety), and Veitch's notes." To this is added by way of a general introduction Professor L. Lévy-Bruhl's essay on the philosophy of Descartes. In thus reprinting in cheap form these philosophical classics, The Open Court Publishing Company are doing a real service to English readers. They are rendering accessible to all, what has heretofore been accessible to only the few. This, however, is less true of Descartes's works than of others which they have reprinted. These are Hume's two *Enquiries*, Berkeley's *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, and the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philo-*

nous. To these have just been added a translation, by Dr. George R. Montgomery, of Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics, and Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology*, in one volume. Other volumes in preparation are Kant's *Prolegomena*, and Anselm's *Proslogium, and Cur Deus Homo.* These will all be favorably received by both university students and general readers.

A. W. CRAWFORD.

The following books also have been received:

Mind in Evolution. By L. T. HOBHOUSE. London, Macmillan & Co., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1901.—pp. xv, 415. $3.25.

Typical Modern Conceptions of God: or The Absolute of German Romantic Idealism, and of English Evolutionary Agnosticism. By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. London, New York, and Bombay, Longmans, Green & Co., 1901.—pp. xii, 190. $1.10 *net.*

The Cambridge Platonists: Being Selections from the Writings of Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, and Nathanel Culverwel, with an Introduction. By E. T. CAMPAGNAC. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1901.—pp. xxxvi, 327. 6s. 6d. *net.*

Lectures and Essays. By the late W. K. CLIFFORD. Edited by LESLIE STEPHEN and FREDERICK POLLOCK. In two volumes. London, Macmillan & Co., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1901. Vol. I, pp. 409. Vol. II, pp. 342. $3.00.

A Scientific Philosophy, the Harbinger of a Scientific Theology; or Steps to Philosophical and Theological Unity. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1901.—pp. xxxiii, 241. 7s. 6d.

The Mental State of Hystericals: A Study of Mental Stigmata and Mental Accidents. By PIERRE JANET, with a Preface by J. M. CHARCOT. Translated by CAROLINE ROLLIN CORSON. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.—pp. xviii, 535. $3.50 *net.*

Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology. With an Introduction by PAUL JANET Translated by G. R. MONTGOMERY. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co.; London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1902.—pp. xxi, 272. 35 cents.

A Sketch of the Vedânta Philosophy. With a Life of S. G. Zâlâ, a typical Vedântin. By M. S. TRIPÂTHI. Second Edition. Bombay, N. M. T. & Co., 1901.—pp. xi, 229.

A Sketch of Semitic Origins: Social and Religious. By GEORGE AARON BARTON. New York, The Macmillan Co.; London, Macmillan & Co., 1902.—pp. xiii, 342. $3.00, *net.*

NOTES.

We regret to announce the recent death from typhoid fever of Professor Robert Adamson of the University of Glasgow. Professor Adamson graduated from the University of Edinburgh in 1871. He afterwards held a Shaw Fellowship and was assistant to the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. From 1876 to 1893 he was Professor of Philosophy at Owens College, Manchester, going in the latter year to the University of Aberdeen. Two years later he was called to the University of Glasgow as successor to the late Professor Veitch. Professor Adamson was perhaps the most profound philosophical scholar in the English-speaking world. Besides his articles on "Logic" and other cognate subjects in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, he was the author of *The Philosophy of Kant* (1879) and the volume *Fichte* in Blackwood Philosophical Classics. He was also one of the main contributors to logical subjects in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, just now appearing, and has long been at work on *A History of Psychology*.

The Senatus Academicus of the University of Glasgow have appointed Émile Boutroux, Professor of the History of Modern Philosophy in the Sorbonne, Paris, to be lecturer on the Gifford foundation, in succession to Dr. Edward Caird, whose term of office will shortly expire.

The American Philosophical Association will hold its first annual meeting March 31st to April 2d, at Columbia University.

We give below a list of articles, etc., in the current philosophical journals:

MIND, No. 41: *F. H. Bradley*, On Active Attention; *A. W. Benn*, The Later Ontology of Plato; *J. S. Mackenzie*, The Hegelian Point of View; *E. A. Singer, Jr.*, Choice and Nature; Critical Notices of Ormond's *Foundations of Knowledge*, Bergmann's *Haupt punkte der Philosophie*, and Simmel's *Die Philosophie des Geldes;* New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE MONIST, XII, 2: *G. Sergi*, The Mediterranean Culture and its Diffusion in Europe; *Editor*, Kant's Philosophy Critically Examined; *Guido Villa*, Psychology and History; *Mary Everest Boole*, Suggestions for Increasing Ethical Stability; *N. Vaschide*, Experimental Investigations of Telepathic Hallucinations; Book Reviews.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XII, 2: *Harald Höffding*, Philosophy and Life; *W. A. Watt*, The Morality of Private and International Action; *J. H. Hyslop*, The Temperance Question; *Zona Vallance*, Women as Moral Beings; *Bernard Bosanquet*, The Dark Ages and the Renaissance; *S. M. Lindsay*, The Modern Workman and Corporate Control; *J. Spens*, The Ethical Significance of Rossetti's Poetry; Discussion; Book

Reviews of Taylor's *The Problem of Conduct*, Wundt's *The Principles of Morality and the Departments of the Moral Life*, etc.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, IX, 1: *G. S. Fullerton*, The World as Mechanism; *Chas. H. Judd*, Practice and its Effects on the Perception of Illusions; *F. C. French*, The Mental Imagery of Students; Discussion and Reports; Psychological Literature; New Books; Notes.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XII, 4: *G. M. Whipple*, An Analytic Study of the Memory Image and the Process of Judgment in the Discrimination of Clangs and Tones; *M. F. Libby*, Influence of the Idea of Æsthetic Proportion on the Ethics of Shaftesbury; *C. R. Squire*, A Genetic Study of Rhythm; *E. C. Sanford*, Improvements in the Vernier Chronoscope; *E. B. Titchener*, Fluctuations of the Attention to Musical Tones; Literature; Book Notes; Index.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE, XXV, 4: *Hans Kleinpeter*, J. B. Stallo als Erkenntniskritiker; *J. W. A. Hickson*, Der Kausalbegriff in der neueren Philosophie und in den Naturwissenschaften von Hume bis Robert Mayer, V. (Schluss); *Paul Barth*, Zum Gedächtnis des Nicolaus Cusanus; Besprechungen; Philosophische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, XXVII, 3: Arthur König; *C. Stumpf*, Ueber das Erkennen von Intervallen und Accorden bei sehr kurzer Dauer; *Helen B. Thompson* und *Katharina Sakijewa*, Ueber die Flächenempfindung in der Haut; *Karl Marbe*, Bemerkung zu der Arbeit von Wiersma; Literaturbericht.

XXVII, 4: *Theodor Lipps*, Zur Theorie der Melodie; *W. A. Nagel*, Stereoskopie und Tiefenwahrnehmung im Dämmerungsehen; *W. A. Nagel*, Ueber die Wirkung des Santonins auf den Farbensinn, insbesondere den dichromatischen Farbensinn; *W. A. Nagel*, Zwei optische Täuschungen; Literaturbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 2: *E. Zeller*, Zu Leucippus; *H. Staigmuller*, Herakleides Pontikos und das keliokentrische System; *Haag*, Voltaire und die bernische Censur; *Joh. Zahlfleisch*, Einige Corollarien des Simplicius in seinem Commentar Zu Aristotles' Physik (ed. Diels); *E. C. H. Peithmann*, Die Naturphilosophie vor Sokrates; Jahresbericht.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK, CXVIII, 1: *J. Volkelt*, Beiträge zur Analyse des Bewusstseins; *H. Siebeck*, Das Problem der Freiheit bei Goethe; *H. Clasen*, Gustav Glogaus System der Philosophie; *H. Gomperz*, Die Welt als geordnetes Ereignis; *R. Hamann*, Das Problem des Tragischen; *H. Leser*, Zur Würdigung Nietzsches; Recension; Notizen; Neu eingegangene Schriften; Aus Zeitschriften.

CXVIII, 2: *H Bromse* u. *E. Grimsehl*, Untersuchungen Zur Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre; *H. Leser*, Zur Würdigung Nietzsches; *H. Clasen*, Gustav Glogaus System der Philosophie; *H. Gomperz*, Die Welt als geordnetes Ereignis; Recension; Notizen; Neu eingegangene Schriften; Aus Zeitschriften.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXVI, 12: *A. Fouillée*, Les jugements de Nietzsche sur Guyau, d'après des documents inédits; *F. Paulhan*, La simulation dans le caractère; *Pulante*, Les dogmatismes sociaux et la libération de l'individu; Revue générale; Revue critique; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Correspondance.

XXVII, 1: *H. Bergson*, L'effort intellectuel; *G. Milhaud*, La loi des quatre états; *G. Dumas*, L'état mental de Saint-Simon (1er article); Notes et discussions; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, VIII, 4: *D. Mercier*, La phénoménisme et l'ancienne métaphysique; *G. Lechalas*, Les fondements de la géométrie à propos d'un livre récent; *E. Masoin*, L'alcool et le crime; *P. M. De Munnynck*, La prémotion physique de l'ancienne école dominicaine; Mélanges et documents; Bulletin de l'institut supérieur de philosophie; Comptes-rendus; Table des matières.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, IV, 5: *C. Cantoni*, Studi Kantiani; *L. Credaro*, I progressi della pedagogia di G. F. Herbart; *G. Cesca*, Il monismo di Ernesto Haeckel; Rassegna bibliografica; Rassegna di opere pedagogiche; Bollettino Bibliografico, etc.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, V, 5–6: *B. Varisco*, L'inconsio; *N. D'Alfonso*, La dottrina dei temperamenti ai nostri giorni; *P. Orano*, Politica e scuola; *G. Pontiggia*, L'interruzione del sogno; *L. Ferriani*, La scuola nella prevenzione sociale; *G. Mazzalorso*, I fondamenti dell' etica in Gian Domenico Romagnosi; *A. Groppali*, Il problema della formazione del diritto secondo le nuove esigenze della critica moderna; *A. De Fabrizio*, Le idee pedagogiche di un Accademico pontaniano; Rassegna di filosofia scientifica; Libri ricevuti e sommari di riviste, etc.